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SUMMARY
The Internet is composed of thousands of Autonomous Systems (ASes) which intercon-
nect with one another to form the “Internet Ecosystem”. The ASes interconnect with one
another through two types of links: (a) transit (customer-provider) and (b) peering links.
Unlike transit links, peering links are optional for all ASes (except for Tier-1 ASes which
form a clique of peering links) in the context of global reachability. Despite being optional,
a rich and dynamic peering fabric exists among ASes in the Internet ecosystem as shown
by various studies. Moreover, the importance of peering has grown as one of the main
instruments for catching up with asymmetric traffic due to CDNs, online video traffic, per-
formance requirements, etc. However, despite its widespread adoption, peering has been
considered a “black art” which is understood in depth by a small community of peering
coordinators only. Despite the interest and the intense debate around it, many fundamental
questions about peering remain elusive.
The objective of this thesis is to study peering from an economics perspective. The
topics explored in this thesis can be divided into the following categories:
1. Fundamental nature of peering among ASes, e.g., what are the main sources of com-
plexity in Internet peering that defy the development of a methodical approach to as-
sess peering relationships? Is peering in the interdomain network a zero-sum game?
2. The current state of the peering ecosystem, e.g., which categories of ASes are more
inclined towards peering? What are the most popular peering strategies among ASes
in the Internet?
3. The economics of contemporary peering practices, e.g., what is the impact of using
xi
different peering traffic ratios as a strategy to choose peers? Is the general notion that
peering saves costs, always valid?
4. Proposition of new peering strategies and their economic comparison with contem-
porary practices.
We have used analytical game-theoretic modeling, large-scale computational agent-
based modeling, and analysis of publicly available peering data to answer the above ques-
tions. The main contributions of this thesis include:
Complexities in Internet Interdomain Peering What are the main sources of complexity
in identifying potential peers, negotiating a stable peering relationship, and utility opti-
mization through peering? How do contemporary operational practices approach these
problems? In this work we address these questions for Tier-2 Network Service Providers.
We identify and explore three major sources of complexity in peering: (a) inability to pre-
dict traffic flows prior to link formation (b) inability to predict economic utility owing to a
complex transit and peering pricing structure (c) computational infeasibility of identifying
the optimal set of peers because of the network structure. We show that framing optimal
peer selection as a formal optimization problem and solving it is rendered infeasible by
the nature of these problems. Our results for traffic complexity show that 15% Network
Service Providers (NSPs) lose some fraction of customer traffic after peering. Addition-
ally, our results for economic complexity show that 15% NSPs lose utility after peering,
approximately, 50% NSPs end up with higher cumulative costs with peering than transit
only, and only 10% NSPs get paid-peering customers.
Computational Agent-based Model of Internet Interdomain Network Formation, Traf-
fic Flow and Economics: As part of the dissertation thesis, we have created GENESIS -
an open-source computational agent-based model of interdomain network formation, traf-
fic flow and economics. GENESIS provides us with an elaborate computational testbed
through which we can experiment with different interconnection and economic strategies,
xii
evaluate them under realistic conditions, and observe how the actions of individual ASes
manifest into large-scale behaviors at the macroscopic level.
Data Analysis of the Peering Ecosystem: We carried out data analysis of a publicly
available dataset. We mined one of the few sources of public data available about the in-
terdomain peering ecosystem: PeeringDB. We analyzed correlations between different AS
characteristics and explored the evolutionary trends of the peering ecosystem, including ge-
ographic expansion of players, increase and decrease in traffic volume of different players,
and shifts toward more restrictive peering.
A Plausible Explanation for Gravitation of Internet Transit Providers Towards Open
Peering: Transit providers are a specific class of networks in the Internet whose business
is to transport traffic from the source to destination. Transit providers prefer to be paid for
this service instead of doing it for free. Recently, however, a large percentage of transit
providers has been offering free peering service to many other ASes. Simultaneously,
transit providers, in general, have reported significant reductions in their profits. Using
some analytical modeling and large-scale simulations with GENESIS, we explained this
counterintuitive phenomenon to be grounded in myopic and selfish decision making of a
few ASes in the Internet. We showed that peering decisions in the Internet are not isolated
locally, but can have non-local network effects. These non-local effects can force other
ASes in the network to follow suit, resulting in a population-wide reduction in profitability.
Proposition of New Practical Peering Strategies: The complexity of the Internet has
forced ASes to adopt simple rules-of-thumb as their peering strategies. Sophisticated peer-
ing strategies have been considered intractable so far. However, our analysis showed that
certain properties of the Internet network structure could be exploited to carry out much
more sophisticated peering strategies in a tractable manner. In this research I have pro-




The Internet interdomain network is a complex network of approximately 50,000 Au-
tonomous Systems (ASes) which interconnect with one another through transit (customer-
provider) or peering links. Peering links fall in one of two categories: (a) settlement-free
and (b) paid. A recent study showed the presence of a rich peering fabric at a major Eu-
ropean IXP, with more than 67% of all possible links formed between 400 member ASes
exchanging more than 10 PB of data on a daily basis [19]. Thus, peering can affect network
performance and reachability of millions of Internet users. In the context of interdomain
connectivity, ASes face an important question: which other ASes should they peer with?
Internet interdomain peering has been in the spot light in one way or the other for the last
two decades because of peering conflicts between different Autonomous Systems (ASes)
in the Internet interdomain network. The importance of these issues can be judged from
the fact that such disputes have increasingly hit the headlines recently, e.g., the Comcast
vs. Level-3 peering dispute [94]. Such disputes have led to litigation, calls for intervention
by regulators [69] and legislation at the highest levels of government [89]. These disputes
have sometimes resulted in the partitioning of the Internet rendering significant organiza-
tions with critical communication needs, e.g., NASA and Federal Aviation Administration
(USA), disconnected from the Internet [103]. Furthermore, the frequency of such disputes
is likely to increase in future [96].
These peering disputes fueled an intense public debate around peering [87]. The de-
bate touched upon nearly all aspects of network interconnections including pricing, traffic
ratios, costs, performance, network neutrality, the power of access ISPs, regulation, etc.
However many fundamental questions are still unanswered. In this thesis we explore the
1
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entire spectrum of Internet interdomain peering from an economic perspective and explore
questions such as: What makes peering so complex that it is understood by a small commu-
nity of peering coordinators only? What are the main sources of complexity in peering that
force the majority of the peering community to resort to simple rules-of-thumb for link for-
mation? Why has peering defied the development of a methodical quantitative approach?
Is the general notion that peering saves costs, always valid? Which peering strategies are
adopted by different types of ASes? Can we explain the counterintuitive phenomenon of a
significant fraction of transit providers adopting Open peering? Furthermore, we propose
new practical techniques and strategies for peering that, if deployed, could yield better
economic utilities.
1.1 Background
Tens of thousands of Autonomous Systems (ASes) interconnect in a complex and dynamic
manner to form the Internet. Each AS is an independent entity under single administrative
control, and is identified through a unique AS number (ASN), which is assigned by a central
authority, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) [15]. Each AS manages its
own internal network topology and traffic routing (intradomain activity) and connects to the
rest of the world by forming links with other geographically co-located ASes (interdomain
activity). These ASes generate traffic destined for other ASes in the Internet, consume
traffic destined for them, and some of them transit traffic, i.e., they carry traffic on behalf
of other ASes to transport it to its destination.
ASes belong to different categories: enterprise networks (or stubs), e.g., university cam-
puses, banks etc.; content sources, which generate much more traffic than they consume,
e.g., Google, Facebook, YouTube etc.; access providers, which consume much more traf-
fic than they generate, e.g., residential ISPs, Comcast, France Telecom; transit providers,
which carry traffic on behalf of other ASes to its destination, e.g., Level 3 Communica-
tions, Cogent etc. Various combinations of the aforementioned categories also exist, e.g.,
3
ASes that provide both transit and access services such as AT&T. Thus, the Internet is a
network of ASes where traffic flows from one AS to another en route to its destination. A
traffic flow may traverse multiple transit providers before reaching its destination AS. Ad-
ditionally, ASes differ in geographic size (expanse) and economic parameters (e.g., transit
prices).
ASes connect with one another mostly through two types of relations: customer-provider
(or “transit”) links and settlement-free peering links. Under the customer-provider relation-
ship, the provider is responsible for connecting the customer with the rest of the Internet.
The provider may itself have a transit provider and so on. Settlement-free peering (sub-
sequently referred to as “peering” for brevity) is more subtle than a customer-provider
relationship. In peering, two ASes (or peers) agree to exchange traffic between themselves
and their customers over a shared link. Peers do not pay each other for this exchange; how-
ever, they share the cost of the link. For example, ASes peering at an Internet Exchange
Point (IXP), use the IXP’s infrastructure for peering. Thus, the IXP’s infrastructure forms
the shared link between the peers. While they do not pay one another for the traffic that
they exchange among themselves, they pay the IXP for usage of its infrastructure.
Peering is typically carried out with the objective of saving transit costs by diverting
traffic from customer-provider links to peering links. ASes generally follow broad rules,
referred to as “peering strategies” to determine their peering links. Examples of such rules-
of-thumb include Open (peer with all co-located ASes except customers), Selective (peer
with only those ASes that have similar traffic volume), Restrictive (do not peer with anyone
unless that is necessary to maintain global reachability). The highest level of the Internet
consists of a clique of approximately 15 ASes fully meshed among themselves through
peering links. This clique is known as the “Tier-1” clique and these ASes are known as
“Tier-1 transit providers”. Tier-1 providers do not require a transit provider as they can
reach the entire Internet through their customers and peers. Figure 1 provides an illustration
of these topological concepts. In Figures 1a and 1b x, y, z, w and T are ASes; T is a Tier-1
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provider, x and y are transit providers, and w and z are stubs. Figure 1a shows the flow
of traffic between transit providers and stubs through the Tier-1 provider. In Figure 1b, the
introduction of a peering link between x and y causes the traffic to flow over a different
path, avoiding the Tier-1 provider altogether. This results in reduced transit costs for x and
y. Figure 1c illustrates the concept of the Tier-1 clique in the Internet. The ASes shown are
Tier-1 providers, which form a complete mesh among themselves through peering links.
Traffic between their customer trees is routed through these peering links.
1.2 Contemporary Peering Practices
In this section we briefly describe how typical large ASes carry out peering in practice.
1.2.1 Identification of potential peers
Identification of potential peers is the first step in peering. One of the ways that operators
use to find potential peers is to analyze traffic flow data collected locally using NetFlow
to identify other ASes with whom they exchange significant volume of traffic. Typically,
this analysis only informs about traffic that is generated and consumed within the AS (and
exchanged with the potential peer), and does not include traffic from the AS’ customers
(and potential peer’s customers) that may be exchanged over the peering link after link
formation.
1.2.2 Selective peering criteria
Since Tier-2 NSPs are in the transit business, they prefer other ASes to be their customers
instead of peers. Thus, most of them adopt selective criteria of some sort to deter peering
applications by smaller ASes. For example, many large NSPs require their peers to be co-
located at multiple geographic locations, maintain a lower bound on the traffic exchanged,
24 × 7 NOC, a lower bound on the capacity of the physical network, etc. NSPs almost
5
(a) Traffic flow before peering
(b) Traffic flow after
peering
(c) Tier-1 clique
Figure 1: Connectivity variants in the interdomain network
always deny peering to their existing customers, while many NSPs also deny peering to
6
their previous customers1.
1.2.3 Preventing asymmetric benefits
Peering is supposed to be mutually beneficial. Most ASes involved in peering would expect
that the cost of peering would be borne equally by both parties. Furthermore, many ASes,
typically large ISPs and NSPs, demand that the benefits derived by both parties in a peering
relationship be roughly equal. For example, NSPs do not want their competitors to free-
ride their networks through peering. NSPs use traffic exchanged over the peering link as a
proxy for the benefits derived from a peering relationship. In order to limit the asymmetry
of benefits, NSPs generally require that the ratio of inbound to outbound traffic be within
certain bounds. If the bound is set to 1 then the traffic in both directions should be equal, if
it is set to a value less than 1 then the inbound traffic should be less than the outbound traffic
and vice versa. Analysis of peering policies published by large NSPs and our discussions
with network operators reveal that contemporary values for this bound, in general, are
between 2 and 5 [3, 13, 4, 1]. This allows an NSP to form settlement-free relationships
with most content providers but excludes a few “hyper-giants” [66] with whom the inbound
traffic would be orders of magnitude greater than the outbound traffic.
1.2.4 Paid peering
In general, NSPs form settlement-free peering relationships with all other ASes which sat-
isfy the requirements of their peering policies, while offering paid peering relationships to
those which do not do so. Paid peering is similar to a conventional customer-provider rela-
tionship, however, whereas a transit provider is responsible for providing a customer con-
nectivity to the entire Internet, a paid-peering provider only offers access to its customers,
in addition to itself. Correspondingly, the price for paid-peering is lower than conventional
transit prices. Little public information is available about the modalities of paid-peering
1Previous customers are denied peering to dissuade existing customers from terminating their contracts
and doing the same.
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as well as prices for paid-peering, as details of most relationships are held private through
non-disclosure agreements.
1.3 Organization
This thesis is organized as follows. We provide a description of the related work in Chapter
2. Chapter 3 describes our baseline model, GENESIS, which we use to model formation of
peering links, traffic flow and economics in the interdomain network. Subsequent chapters
use different variations of the baseline model to address different questions. Each chapter
describes the variations as well. Chapter 4 addresses the fundamental problems in peering,
e.g., what precludes the development of methodical quantitative approach to find the opti-
mal set of peers, etc. We provide details of a data analysis study of the peering ecosystem
from August 2010 to August 2013 in chapter 5. Chapter 6 discusses a plausible explanation
for the gravitation of Internet transit providers towards Open peering policy. In chapter 6,
we propose two new peering strategies to mitigate the effects of large-scale Open peering
and carry out more precise cost-benefit-analysis for each peer. Chapter 7 provides major
conclusions from the thesis and an outlook for potential questions in the area for the future.
CHAPTER II
RELATED WORK
There is a large body of research literature dedicated to the study of the structure of the
Internet interdomain network. These works, which mostly involve empirical studies of
the interdomain network, include inference and classification of inter-AS relationships,
study of static topological properties of the interdomain network e.g., degree distribution,
diameter, etc., measurement and link discovery techniques, exploration of the evolution of
the network over time, etc.
2.1 Internet Topology at the AS level
Faloutsos et al. propose that the interdomain network follows a power-law distribution [46].
However, Chen et al. argue that the interdomain network may not be “scale-free” because
of the difficulty in observing all links [31]. Gao proposes a model to classify inter-AS
relationships acquired through BGP data into customer-provider, sibling and peering rela-
tionships by exploiting the “valley-free routing policy” of the Internet [50]. Zhang et al.
prpose a list of resources that can be exploited to get more data about the topology of the
network [110]. Oliveira et al. evaluate different AS-relationship inference methods using
case studies of different ASes. [91]. Dimitropoulos et al. propose some heuristics to dis-
cover inter-AS relationships and s [42]. Luckie et al. continue this line of work and propose
heuristics which are better at discovering peering relationships from BGP data [79]. Knight
et al. explore the PoP-level topological data of more than 200 ASes and argue that the In-
ternet topology does not conform to any specific model so far [65]. Gill et al. show that




2.2 Evolution of the AS-level Internet topology
Amogh et al. study the evolution of the Internet topology in terms of its growth and re-
wiring from 1998 to 2010 [37]. Their analysis shows that despite exponential growth in
the population of the ASes, the average path length in the network is practically constant,
implying that the network densifies over time. They also find that a positive correlation
exists between the customer degree of a provider and attraction and repulsion for future
customers. They also analyze the regional growth of the Internet and conclude that the
growth of the Internet in Europe exceeds all other regions of the globe. Shavitt et al. study
the evolution of the topological actions by large content providers from 2006 to 2011 [98].
They show a densification of links between large content providers and non-Tier1 nodes of
the interdomain network.
2.3 Interconnections in the Internet from an industrial organization per-
spective
Many works focus on Internet economics from industrial organization perspective. Faratin
et al. show that changing conditions have resulted in a more diverse and complex inter-
connection market in the Internet [47]. Ghodsi et al. advocate that the Internet move from
the current point-to-point connection architecture to information or content centric archi-
tecture [51]. Laffont et al. develop a framework for competition in the Internet transit
market [68]. Hermalin et al. explore the question about who decides which network car-
ries the transaction in an envrionment where traffic traverses more than one intermediary
network [61].
2.4 Network formation Models
2.4.1 Graph Theoretic Models
Zegura et al. carried out one of the first works in this domain and proposed graph gen-
eration models as well as metrics to compare the graphs generated by models in this
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category [108, 109]. Various graph theoretic models aim to reproduce observed Internet
topological properties (e.g., power-law degree distribution [46]) [105, 107, 106]. Another
class of models take a bottom-up approach [70], modeling the optimization objectives and
constraints of individual ASes, to create graphs that have the same topological properties
[70, 45, 28, 34].
2.4.2 Agent-based Computational Models
Agent-based computational models that simulate the dynamics of the network formation
process, capturing the asynchronous and decentralized process through which nodes adjust
their connectivity, have also been proposed in the literature and used for various studies.
The model by Holme et al. [62] is similar to our computational model but it does not include
peering and realistic routing. The model of Chang et al. [29] uses hard-wired strategies for
provider and peer selection, among other differences. The model of Dhamdhere et al. [41]
is more similar to our model but it assigns a specific function to each node (e.g., content
provider) and it focuses on the differences between two Internet instances (hierarchical
versus “flat”). Lodhi et al. propose GENESIS, another computational agent-based model
for modeling interdomain network formation, traffic flow and economics [74].
2.4.3 Game-theoretic Models
A large body of work on game-theoretic network formation models exists in the com-
puter science and economics literature. We refer the interested reader to two recent books
[56, 64]. Those models capture the objectives and potential strategies of each node, as play-
ers in a non-cooperative game, and they focus on proving the existence of (typically many)
equilibria. The need for mathematical tractability, however, requires significant simplifica-
tions (such as lack of geographic constraints, simple cost functions, or uniform traffic flow
between nodes. Consequently, the resulting networks are typically simple graphs, such as
rings, trees or other regular structures.
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2.5 The role of IXPs in the Interdomain Network
IXPs have played a key role in changing the landscape of Internet interconnection by pro-
viding facilities for large-scale peering. The nature and role of IXPs has been the subject
of many recent works. Augustin et al. carry out active probing to determine IXP member-
ships [23]. Chatzis et al. highlight the role of IXPs not only in the context of the Internet
interconnections, but also in the context of data centers, cloud computing and SDN [30].
Ager et al. analyze membership, interconnection and traffic flow data from a large Eu-
ropean IXP [19]. Gupta et al. present a possible implementation of a Software-Defined-
Internet-Exchange to take advantage of SDN [57].
2.6 Properties of the Interdomain Network Traffic Matrix
Accurately measuring, estimating and modeling traffic matrices is key to ensuring stable
peering relationships. Medina et al. present a taxonomy of IP traffic matrices [83]. The
thesis by Chang presents various economic-based approaches to measuring and modeling
traffic matrices [27]. Labovitz et al. show that the video constitutes a significant fraction
of Internet traffic today and that 80-20 rule also exists in the Internet traffic generation
and consumption market [67]. Roughan et al. show how to do traffic engineering with
only estimated traffic matrices [95]. Gursun et al. explore which ASes in the interdomain
network hierarchy are in a better position to infer the elements of the interdomain traffic
matrix [95].
2.7 Internet Economics
Internet economics is a wide-ranging subject covering many areas e.g., pricing, cost-benefit-
analysis techniques, market-share analysis, determination of tiered-pricing structure, prof-
itability under different interconnection strategies etc. We identify some representative
works in this domain. Hosanagar et al. contend that CDNs will have to lower prices to
stay competitive in the connectivity market [63]. Motiwala et al. argue that signifcant
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cost reductions can be achieved through re-routing a relatively small portion of traffic [85].
Stanojevic et al. discuss how customers generate costs for access providers [101]. Dim-
itropoulos et al. discuss the 95th percentile billing method widely used in the Internet [44].
Shakkottai et al. explore the interaction between multiple ISPs through price setting when
they may or may not be competing for the same customers [97]. Valancius et al. show
that optimal utility by transit providers can be achieved by establishing only a few pricing
tiers [104]. Gyarmati et al. analyze backbone cost-sharing policies by operators to deter-
mine which policy gives optimal results [59]. Hasan et al. develop an optimization model to
optimize the placement of caches to reduce costs for CDNs [60]. Dhamdhere et al. explore
if ISPs can be profitable without violating the net neutrality principles [40]. Castro et al.
propose T4P, a hybrid routing scheme allowing peers to use common upstream links to re-
duce transit costs [16]. Lodhi et al. carry out a data analysis study of the peering ecosystem
based on the data published in PeeringDB from August 2010 to August 2013 [18].
2.8 Economics of Peering Interconnections
There has been much prior work on economic analysis of peering in the interdomain net-
work covering various aspects of the peering ecosystem including pricing, paid-peering,
utility optimization heuristics, policy adoption, etc. An extensive line of research has taken
an analytical approach to explore paid-peering. Shrimali et al. study linear pricing schemes
for paid-peering between two providers [99]. Dhamdhere et al. propose a quantitative
framework to determine the value of a peering link for both peers involved [39]. Ma et al.
analyze the use of Shapley value for revenue distribution among peers [82]. There is also
prior work on the game-theoretic analysis of settlement-free peering and transit vs. peer-
ing [25, 73, 24, 22, 84, 35]. However, for reasons of mathematical tractability, these models
often study networks with a small number of players. Therefore, many complexities that
arise out of the interaction of a large number of autonomous agents do not appear in these
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works. Furthermore, they also ignore many real-world features of the interdomain net-
work, e.g., a highly skewed traffic matrix, geographic co-location constraints, ratio-based
peering policies, capacity constraints of IXP ports, complex non-linear pricing structure,
etc. Another line of work has focused on models in which ASes select transit providers,
settlement-free peers or peering policies based on economic factors and other constraints to
optimize their utility [77, 45, 28, 29]. Lodhi et al. attribute the gravitation of Internet transit
providers towards Open peering to myopic and selfish decisions by ISPs [77]. They also
propose cost-benefit-analysis based peering strategy [76]. Norton provides an excellent
discussion of various aspects of peering practices from an operations aspect [88].
Gyarmati et al. propose an analytical framework to quantify a fair price that should be
paid by either a content provider or ISP (access provider) if they form a premium paid-
peering interconnection [58]. Their model assumes performance benefits to be gained from
premium peering and churn among the customers responding to performance variation.
Thus, both content providers and access customers have an incentive to engage in pre-
mium peering to acquire more customers. They compute a Nash bargaining solution to
determine which side of the peering interconnection should pay and how much to form
a stable peering link. They also create an online tool to do these calculations for custom
scenarios [17]. Our models in this thesis operate at the scale of the interdomain network,
modeling the interactions of multiple autonomous systems, while ignoring activity within
the ASes. Whereas, the framework of Gyarmati et al. models the actions of individual cus-
tomers within access ISPs and revenue from individual streams within content providers, in
a specific geographic market. While this is promising work in the right direction, there are
still significant challenges to be overcome particularly for parameterization of such mod-
els. Additionally, in some geographic regions, access ISPs offer Internet access bundled
with other services, e.g., cable television and telephone, making it hard to assess the deci-
sions of the individual customers. Furthermore, sometimes the customers are also obliged
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to keep their subscriptions with their ISPs for extended periods of time under contract. Fi-
nally, the bargaining power of content providers is an open question since there is very little
competition at the level of access ISPs.
CHAPTER III
GENESIS: AN AGENT-BASED MODEL OF INTERDOMAIN
NETWORK FORMATION, PEER SELECTION, TRAFFIC FLOW
AND ECONOMICS
This chapter describes the basic version of our network formation model - GENESIS. Dif-
ferent variants of GENESIS are used in subsequent chapters of this thesis. While the vari-
ants differ in some aspects, the overall structure of our model remains the same. We explain
each variation in its corresponding chapter.
3.1 Model Description
We consider a population of N nodes (representing Autonomous Systems) which inter-
connect through two types of links: customer-provider and peering. Each node has the
following attributes: a set of locations in which it is present, an amount of traffic it sends
to and receives from every other node, and certain economic parameters, such as the transit
price it would charge to its potential customers at a given location.
We next describe each component of GENESIS in more detail. A complete description
of the model, with a longer justification, is available at a technical report [5]. The source
code for the simulator that executes GENESIS is available at the same URL.
Geographical presence: There are GM locations, and a node x is present at a set G(x)
of locations. These locations are roughly analogous to Internet Exchange Points (IXPs).
Two nodes overlap if they share at least one location. For node x, O(x) denotes the set of
networks that overlap with x. A link between two nodes can be formed if they overlap.
Traffic matrix and transit traffic: The element Txy of the N-by-N interdomain traffic
matrix T denotes the average traffic volume generated by node x and consumed by node
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y. Overall, x generates traffic VG(x) and consumes VC(x). Txx=0, i.e., we do not capture
the local traffic within a network. The transit traffic VT (x) of x is the traffic volume that is
neither generated nor consumed by x – it only passes through x enroute to its destination.
The transit traffic of a node depends on the underlying network topology and the routing
algorithm. Even if the interdomain traffic matrix T is constant, the transit traffic of a node
may change as the underlying topology changes. The total traffic volume of a node V (x)
is given by the following expression:
V (x) = VC(x) + VG(x) + VT (x) (1)
Economic attributes: The economic attributes of a node include its transit prices (one
for each location it is present at).
Transit cost: Let x be a transit customer of y, and let Py(x) be the lowest transit price
of y across all regions in which x and y overlap. If VP (x) is the traffic exchanged between
x and y, then the transit payment from x to y is:
TC(x) = Py(x)× VP (x)τ (2)
where τ is a transit traffic exponent that captures the economies of scale observed in prac-
tice. The transit revenue TR(y) of y is simply the sum of transit costs paid by all customers
of y.
Peering cost: Nodes engaging in settlement-free peering relations share the underlying
peering costs. There are two primary mechanisms for peering — private and public —
that have different cost structures. If the traffic exchanged between two peers is less than a
threshold Ψ they peer publicly at an IXP, otherwise they peer privately. In public peering,
nodes exchange traffic over a common switching fabric at an IXP, aggregating traffic from
different peering sessions through the same port, whereas in private peering they set up a
direct link with each peer.
Private peering cost: Let VPP (x, y) be the traffic exchanged between node x and its
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where α is the peering cost per Mbps and β is the peering traffic exponent that accounts for
the corresponding economies of scale.
Public peering cost: Let VPP (x, z) be the traffic exchanged between node x and its peer
z over the public peering infrastructure. As x aggregates all its public peering traffic over
the same port, the corresponding cost is:





Fitness1: The fitness of a node represents its net profit,
πx = TR(x)− TC(x)− PCpub(x)− PCprv(x) (5)
If a node is a stub, i.e., a node without any customers, the first term is zero and the node’s
fitness will be negative.
Peering: Two nodes x and y are potential peers if they satisfy two peering criteria —
x and y overlap geographically, and they do not have an existing customer-provider rela-
tionship. Additionally, a node x uses a peering strategy S(x) to determine which of its
potential peers it wants to peer with. Unlike provider selection, where a customer unilater-
ally chooses its provider, peering is a bilateral decision process. Thus, two potential peers
x and y can peer iff the constraints of both S(x) and S(y) are satisfied. Depeering, how-
ever, is a unilateral decision by one of the peers. By default, GENESIS uses three peering
strategies described in section 3.2.
Provider selection: A node must have a transit provider if it cannot reach all other
nodes in the network via its peers and customers. Node x selects a provider y if: (a) x
overlaps with y, (b) y is “larger” than x (explained next), (c) y is not a peer of x, (d) y is
1Fitness and Utility are used interchangeably in this thesis.
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not a customer of an existing peer of x, and (e) y is the least expensive among all nodes
that satisfy the previous constraints. We say that a node y is larger than a node x if y is
present in at least as many locations as x, and it carries more transit traffic than x. If a node
x cannot find a provider that fulfills the previous criteria, then x becomes a tier − 1 (T1)
AS. In order to ensure a connected network, T1 nodes form a clique using peering links,
even if they do not overlap.
Routing: In GENESIS, interdomain routing follows the shortest path subject to two
common policy constraints: “prefer customer over peer over provider links” and satisfy the
“valley-free” routing property.
Initial topology: To create the initial network topology, we select nodes sequentially
and at random. For a selected node x, we determine its provider randomly from the set of
nodes that (a) overlap with x, (b) are not in the customer tree of x, and (c) have greater
geographic expanse than x. If we cannot find a provider for a node, then it joins the clique
of tier-1 networks.
Network formation process: An execution, or sample path, of GENESIS proceeds in
discrete time units called iterations. In each iteration, every node plays asynchronously
once. The order in which nodes play during an iteration is determined at the start of the
sample path, and it remains the same throughout that sample path. Every time a node
plays, it carries out the following actions: (a) Examine depeering with existing peers, (b)
Examine peering with new peers, (c) Provider selection, and (d) Peering strategy update.
At the end of each iteration, we recompute the fitness of each node. If none of the nodes has
adjusted its connectivity and peering strategy in that iteration, then it is easy to show that
there will be no changes in subsequent iterations, and we say that GENESIS has reached
an equilibrium.
The state of the network at any point in time can be defined based on the connections
and peering strategy of all nodes. Two states A and B are distinct if they differ in terms
of the underlying network topology or the peering strategy of one or more nodes. Even if
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we start with the same population of nodes and the same initial topology, two sample paths
can result in two distinct equilibria as a result of different playing orders.
3.2 Default Peering Strategies
The peering strategies that we consider in the default model are the following three:
1. Restrictive: A node that uses this strategy does not peer with any other node unless
if that is mandatory to maintain global reachability (“peering-by-necessity”). This
peering strategy is followed only by T1 nodes; those nodes form a clique to keep the
network connected.
2. Open: A node that uses this strategy agrees to peer with any other node that it over-
laps with (except direct customers). In the default GENESIS model, the Open peer-
ing strategy is followed by stubs because those nodes aim to reduce their transit costs
by peering with as many other nodes as possible.
3. Selective: A node x that uses this strategy agrees to peer with node y if Vx
Vy
≤ σ
(σ > 0). In practice, there is a wide range of Selective peering strategies with several
additional constraints and parameters (e.g., a minimum link capacity or a minimum
number of points-of-presence) [1]. Our Selective strategy is only a model that aims
to capture the essence of those requirements through a simple formula and single pa-
rameter σ. The Selective peering strategy in the default GENESIS model is followed
by non-T1 transit providers.
3.3 Scalability and Parameterization based on Real World Data
GENESIS is currently parameterized based on the statistical characteristics of real world
parameters. GENESIS is capable of directly incorporating real world data, e.g., topology
from BGP advertisements, geographic co-location from PeeringDB, etc. However, scala-
bility of the current implementation restricts it to model the entire interdomain network.
Increasing the scalability of GENESIS is one of the key items for our future work.
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If GENESIS’ implementation can successfully model the entire interdomain network,
certain short-term micro effects, e.g., formation of a peering link between certain ASes,
may be predicted. However, uncertainty in some parameters, particularly traffic flows and
the timing of AS actions can limit the ability of GENESIS to predict all effects with com-
plete accuracy.
CHAPTER IV
COMPLEXITIES IN INTERNET INTERDOMAIN PEERING
We explore the fundamental aspects of peering in this chapter. We explore the main com-
plexities in identifying new peers, choosing the optimal set of peers among a given set of
peering candidates and evaluating existing peers over time. As explained in Chapter 1,
most ASes use simple rules-of-thumb to make such decisions. We explore the obstacles in
developing a methodical approach to making such decisions. We address these questions
for a specific class of ASes, the Tier-2 Network Service Providers (NSPs). We choose to
focus on NSPs (or transit providers) because they appear in all three AS roles in the in-
terdomain network, namely providers, customers and peers, simultaneously. Additionally,
their “selective” peering policies are more complex than the simpler “open” and “restric-
tive” policies of stubs and Tier-1 providers respectively. We focus on three major sources
of complexity which we evaluate separately:
1. Limited ability to determine and accurately predict traffic flows.
2. Limited ability to accurately forecast the effect of peering on utility owing to a com-
plicated pricing structure.
3. Infeasibility of determining the optimal set of peers because of the combined effects
of topology and routing policy.
4.1 Variation of GENESIS and Parameterization
We vary our basic model GENESIS presented in Chapter 2 for the purpose of this evaluation
as follows.
Peering Policies: Nodes form peering relationships based on their peering policies
which are assigned to them based on their status in the network hierarchy. We use the
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following peering policies in our model:
1. Restrictive: Nodes using this strategy do not peer with any other node unless required
to ensure global reachability. Restrictive policy is assigned to Tier-1 NSPs.
2. Open: Nodes using this policy peer with all co-located nodes. All stubs use this
peering policy.
3. Selective: Selective policy is used by Tier-2 NSPs. A node i using Selective peering
policy will agree to peer with another node j if the traffic exchanged between them




where σ is a traffic ratio constraint which is uniform and constant across all nodes
using Selective policy1 and T ′ij is the actual traffic exchanged over the peering link
between i and j, L′ij . It is difficult to estimate T
′
ij (and vice versa) without actually
forming Lpij . Therefore, nodes use local traffic, Tij , instead of actual traffic, T
′
ij , to
identify peers and verify policy constraints prior to link formation. All our players of
interest use Selective peering policy.
Since peering is a bilateral relationship both peers must conform to each other’s peering
policies before a link is formed. The set of peers of a node i is denoted by F (i).
Transit Cost and Revenue: Traffic exchanged over customer-provider links is metered.
For the traffic (T ′ij + T
′
ji) exchanged between i and its provider j over the link L
t
ij , i incurs
a transit cost TC(i, j) given by:
TC(i, j) = P t(T ′ij + T
′
ji)× (T ′ij + T ′ji) (7)
1In reality, Selective peering policies have additional constraints, e.g., co-location at more than one loca-
tion, minimum requirements for the volume of traffic exchanged, etc. However, we only use traffic ratios for
simplicity.
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where P t(T ′ij + T
′
ji) is the price ($/Mbps) for the corresponding traffic volume. The





The transit revenue, of i, TR(i), is the sum of the costs incurred by the customers of i
for their transit links with it.
Peering Costs at IXPs: Players utilize the ports at the IXPs to peer with one another
and exchange their peering traffic. IXP costs are fixed monthly recurring costs based on
the number and type of ports that a node has acquired at the IXP. When i peers with j, it
checks if any of its existing IXP ports with leftover capacity T ′ij + T
′
ji and routes over that
port, otherwise it acquires a new port of minimum size required to accommodate the traffic.
Let pc(i) be the number of ports of capacity c Mbps being utilized by i and Ep(c) be





P p(c)× pc(i) (9)
Paid Peering: There is no publicly available data about paid-peering prices. Therefore,
we use anecdotal evidence gathered from peering coordinators and various online peering
discussions [9] to set the paid-peering price for traffic volume t to one half that of the transit
price for the same traffic volume. Finally, both paid-peers use a private interconnect at the
IXP to exchange their traffic separate from settlement-free peering traffic. For simplicity,
the private interconnect incurs a cost equal to the cost of the public interconnect with the
same capacity. The paid-peering revenue and costs for node i are denoted by PC(i) and
PR(i) respectively.
Analysis for a paid-peering relationship is carried out only if one of the peers does
not satisfy the other’s peering policy requirements. For example, if j does not satisfy
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i’s policy constraints, then i carries out a cost-benefit-analysis of accepting j as its paid-
peering customer, based on traffic Tij + Tji. The cost-benefit-analysis involves calculating
the effect of moving the traffic Tij +Tji from the link on which it is currently being routed2
to the proposed link Lpij . i offers j to become a paid-peering customer if the cost-benefit-
analysis indicates that acquiring j would increase its utility. j upon receiving the offer
carries cost-benefit-analysis at its own end and accepts the offer if its analysis shows that
its utility will also increase. On the other hand, if i does not satisfy j’s peering policy, then
an offer to become a paid-peering customer is made by j and a similar analysis is carried
out, albeit with roles reversed. Thus, a paid-peering relationship is formed if and only if
cost-benefit-analysis by both nodes shows that their utility will increase as a result of the
relationship. Note that the actual cost may differ from the one estimated by cost-benefit-
analysis because the actual traffic (T ′ij + T
′
ji) ≥ (Tij + Tji).
Utility: The utility of a player i is determined by its peering links, the traffic traversing
those links and how this traffic is distributed over IXP ports. The utility of i is given by:
πi = TR(i) + PR(i)− TC(i)− PC(i)− IC(i) (10)
Note that although the transit prices and the traffic matrix T are constant, the underlying
topology changes as i chooses different peers. Hence, the costs, revenues and utilities may
change as the topology changes.
The objective of player i is to maximize πi through peering.
Network Formation: Starting from a random population, we create an initial topology
by assigning each node (except Tier-1 nodes) with at least one transit provider using the
constraints described in the default model. It produces a network hierarchy similar to that
of the Internet at scale, without any peering links. Tier-1 nodes are not assigned transit
providers and they form a complete mesh of peering links among themselves similar to the
Tier-1 ASes in the Internet.
2The current link carrying this traffic may be a transit link or an existing settlement-free or paid-peering
link.
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Table 1: Transit and Peering Prices
Transit & Paid Peering IXP Peering












t < 1 6 3 0.1 100
1 ≤ t < 10 4 2 1 800
10 ≤ t < 100 1 0.5 10 1700
t ≥ 100 0.4 0.2 100 7820
After the creation of initial topology, network formation proceeds in discrete iterations
called rounds. In each round all Tier-2 NSPs play once, one at a time. When a Tier-2 NSP
i plays, it actively seeks to form peering relationships with other nodes, while the other
nodes only evaluate incoming peering requests.
4.1.1 Parameterization
The values for our parameters are given in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 shows the median prices
for different traffic ranges and port sizes at IXPs, reported by TeleGeography [102] and
the websites of the following IXPs: AMS-IX [21], DEC-IX [36], LINX [72]. We consider
high-end pricing at IXPs for the same port sizes so that the performance is comparable
under transit and IXP peering. We ignore one-time fixed costs, e.g., initial IXP membership
costs.
4.2 Traffic Uncertainty in Peering
In this section we evaluate the first source of complexity, i.e., the effect of imperfect traffic
prediction prior to establishing a peering link. In section 1.2.1 we described that ASes
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Table 2: Input Parameters
Parameter, Symbol, Description Value Explanation
Number of ASes N 2000 Time constraints for the simulation
Number of geographic locations GMax 100 Based on approximate ratio of IXPs to peering
networks in the Internet. PeeringDB ratio 18.55.
Model ratio 20.0 [14]
Geographic expanse distribution Zipf(1.6) Based on data about number of participants at
each IXP collected from PeeringDB [14]. IXP
locations are randomly assigned to each node.
Maximum points-of-presence for an AS 15
Generated traffic distribution Zipf(1.2) It generates a heavy-tailed distribution consistent
with the behavior reported in [26], [48] & [66].
With this distribution, 0.1% of the ASes generate
nearly 30% of the total traffic.
Consumed traffic distribution Zipf(0.8) Produces heavy-tailed distribution of incoming
traffic, similar to internally measured traffic
distribution at a large US public university.
Maximum consumed traffic 8 Tbps Estimated Comcast traffic [92]. Consumed traffic
of a node is proportional to its
points-of-presence, the rationale being that a
node with large expanse will also have a large
number of access customers.
Selective peering ratio σ 3.0 Peering policies of different NSPs, e.g.,
[3, 13, 4, 1]
Multihoming Degree 2 Fixed for all non-Tier1 nodes for
simplicity. [38]
typically employ NetFlow to identify its potential peers. We discuss each of these sources
of uncertainty as follows.
4.2.1 Limited Information from NetFlow
Consider the network shown in figure 2 where a Tier-2 NSP i attempts to determine if j
is a potential peer. In order to identify potential peers, a Tier-2 NSP i employs NetFlow
to analyze the origin and destination of its local traffic, i.e., traffic generated within i and
consumed at another co-located AS j and vice versa, i.e., T̂ij . i also estimates the ratio of
inbound to outbound traffic Tji/Tij using this data. However, this analysis ignores the fact
that x and y, which are customers of i and j respectively, may also exchange traffic over
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the proposed link Lpij . Thus, the maximum traffic that may be exchanged over L
p
ij is:
max(T ′ij + T
′
ji) = T̂ij + T̂iy + T̂jx + T̂xy
In this case, while NetFlow informs i that T̂xy flows through its network, i cannot determine
if this traffic also flows through j. Even after employing other tools, e.g, traceroute and
analysis of BGP announcements, i cannot be certain about the path taken by T̂xy because
of asymmetric routing and multihoming in the interdomain network. This uncertainty may
negatively affect the peering decisions of i as follows:
Premature rejection: Let
Tij + Tji  T ′ij + T ′ji
Then i may assume that it does not exchange a significant volume of traffic with j and
prematurely decide not initiate peering negotiations. Whereas, if it had accurate estimates
of the traffic that would flow over the peering link, it would have moved down the check








In this case, i may peer with j assuming that j satisfies its traffic ratio requirement.
However, once the link is formed and traffic starts flowing over Lpij , i will determine that its
peering requirements are not being met by j. Such situations, which arise out of inaccurate
estimates of traffic prior to link formation, are one of the causes of peering conflicts in the
real world.
4.2.2 Dynamic Routing
The interdomain network, constituting its physical structure and traffic flows, self-organizes










Figure 2: Limited Information from NetFlow
of the ASes. This results in a complex network where peering links between different
ASes may have non-local effects, i.e., they may affect the traffic flows over other ASes and
links [77]. Once a peering link is formed by i, its customers (and those of the peer, if it
has any) may update their routes given the changes in the network. Assuming default BGP
configuration to choose the shortest routes, these updates may cause customer traffic which
was not previously routed through i to flow through i and vice versa. Both scenarios have
a direct impact on the peering relationships of i and its utility. We illustrate both cases as
follows.
Addition of traffic: Consider the network shown in figure 3. Prior to formation of
Lpij , as shown in figure 3a, traffic T̂xy from its customer x bypasses i as route x → k →
Tier1B → j → y is one hop short of the route x→ i→ Tier1A→ Tier1B → j → y.
Since this traffic bypasses i, it has no way of measuring it. Additionally, x does not know
the route taken by this traffic. However, once the peering link Lpij is formed, i offers a
shorter route x → i → j → y than the one previously chosen by x. Hence, i may
experience an upsurge in customer traffic, which it could not predict prior to the execution























(b) After formation of Lpij
Figure 3: Addition of traffic after formation of a peering link
Reduction in traffic: Consider the network shown in figure 4. Prior to formation of
Lpij , as shown in figure 4a, traffic T̂xy from its customer x flows through i taking route
x → i → Tier1 → y. However, once the peering link Lpij is formed, i no longer routes
traffic through the Tier1 node because of “prefer-peer-over-provider” routing policy. This,
however, increases the path length for T̂xy as it is routed over the path x→ i→ j → k → y.
Therefore, x routes traffic away from i to its second provider j offering it a shorter path
x→ j → k → y. Hence, i may experience a decline in customer traffic, which it could not
predict prior to formation of the peering link. Note that these path-selection decisions may
take place autonomously without any human intervention.
Although i can infer the topology of the interdomain network using different inference
techniques, these techniques are limited in that they cannot accurately discover peering

















(b) After formation of Lpij
Figure 4: Reduction in traffic after formation of a peering link
4.2.3 Computational Results
We illustrated the main sources of traffic uncertainty using simple examples in sections 4.2.1
and 4.2.2. In this section we explore, through large-scale computational simulations based
on our model of section 4.1, the extent to which these complexities manifest themselves in
large-scale networks similar to the Internet.
We carry out 1000 simulations of our model, each with a unique population and initial
topology. As Tier-2 NSPs play during network formation, we measure the number of traffic
flows and total traffic volume transiting each Tier-2 NSP i before and after it forms a peering





been formed. Our objective is to determine the changes in traffic volume of i with each
new peering link and the fraction of peering relationships which fall in the category of
“premature acceptance” as described in section 4.2.1.
We find that only 10% peering links fall in the category of “premature acceptance” by
one of the peers, i.e., a posteriori analysis of the traffic on the peering link reveals that
the traffic ratio is out of bounds for one of the peers. All peering links in this category
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are those which are formed between Tier-2 NSPs. If one of the peers has a major content
provider and the other has a major access ISP as its customer, the traffic on link is likely to
be asymmetric. However, such asymmetries are not detected during peer evaluation phase
as players only take into account local traffic and ignore customer traffic.
Figure 5 shows the relative difference between the number of traffic flows and traffic
volume before and after each peering link is formed by each Tier-2 NSP. We find that
approximately 85% peering links result in an overall increase in the number of traffic flows
and traffic volume transiting the player. However, because of the skewed nature of the
traffic distribution, the addition or removal of a few traffic flows carrying traffic for major
content or access providers can significantly affect the traffic volume transiting a node.
Furthermore, changes in traffic volume have a direct bearing on the utility of the players.
Our analysis shows that the peering links contributing to a significant increase (≥ 50%)
in the number of traffic flows are the ones which are formed between two Tier-2 NSPs.
These players have large number of customers which often find that a peering link between
their providers offers them a shorter path to one another. Whereas, the most significant
increase in traffic volume (≥ 50%) arises from peering directly with major content and
access providers. Interestingly, we find that the Tier-2 NSPs undergoing significant losses
in traffic volume with peering are the ones which have major content or access providers as
their customers. These large nodes are often multihomed to Tier-1 nodes providing them
with short paths to the entire network. Any peering link formed by their Tier-2 providers
that increases their path length by even a single hop can lead these large nodes to divert
their traffic away from the Tier-2 provider.
These results imply that the scope of analysis for peering decisions should not be lim-
ited to local traffic only; instead it should also incorporate customer traffic data as much as
possible. Furthermore, the identification and evaluation of peers using NetFlow is inher-
ently inaccurate for Tier-2 NSPs and may result in premature rejection of peers, premature
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Figure 5: Relative difference between number of traffic flows and volume before and after
formation of a peering link
on utility.
4.3 Economic Uncertainty in Peering
In this section, we evaluate the second obstruction to optimal peering choices, i.e., a com-
plex transit and peering prices structure that has evolved as transit providers and IXPs try
to lure customers towards themselves.
4.3.1 Analysis for Settlement-free Peering
Over a period of time simple rules-of-thumb have come in usage to decide the mode of
traffic exchange, e.g., move as much traffic as possible to a settlement-free peering link to
cut down costs.
Figure 8 shows that peering costs are much lower than transit costs for the same traffic
volume. Hence, the first instinct of many operators is to offload as much traffic as possible
on peering links. However, the analysis has to be carried out in totality because diverting
traffic from a transit link to a peering link may also affect the transit price per unit traffic.
We illustrate this complexity by the following example. Consider a Tier-2 NSP i with 10
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Gbps upstream transit traffic. It would incur a monthly cost of $10,000 in transit payments.
Let us assume that i can divert as much as 50% of its traffic onto peering links at an IXP.
With 5 Gbps transit and peering traffic each, the transit cost of i becomes $20,000 with
an additional IXP cost of $1700, thus resulting in a total cost of $21,700 - an increase
of $11,700 over the original cost. The transit cost increased dramatically because of the
complex economies-of-scale engineered in the pricing structure.
Effect on utility components
The general notion is that settlement-free peering increases utility by lowering tran-
sit costs. In section 4.2 we showed that peering can change the traffic volume transiting
through a network. We show that possible traffic variation and the complex pricing struc-
ture can affect all components of utility under settlement-free peering: transit and peering
costs and transit revenues.
Computational Results: We simulate 1000 instances, each with a unique population
and initial topology, of our model. In each simulation, we record the utility and its compo-
nents of each Tier-2 NSP before and after it has committed its peering decisions.
Our analysis shows that 10% of players actually have their utility decreased after peer-
ing. Furthermore, 1.5% of players have their utility decreased by more than 50%.
Figure 6 shows the change in transit revenue, transit costs and cumulative costs (sum of
transit and peering costs) for players which undergo a decrease in utility. Although transit
costs decrease for 80% of such players, yet the cumulative costs increase for 75% of them.
Similarly, 34% of such players also face a loss in revenue as their customers divert traffic
away from them after peering. Figure 7 shows similar analysis for players which increase
their utility. Although cumulative costs increase for 50% of such players, yet they are able
to register a net benefit through an increase in transit revenue as well. Thus, NSPs require















































































































Figure 7: Effect on utility components of Tier-2 NSPs with an increase in utility after
peering
4.3.2 Analysis for Paid-peering
Although paid-peering has been getting a lot of attention recently, our simulations show
that only a small fraction of NSPs are able to form paid peering links. We attribute limited
adoption of paid peering to the following two reasons:
1. On average, 70% potential peers of a Tier-2 NSP i satisfy its traffic ratio require-
ments. Hence, i cannot ask them to be its paid peering customers.
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2. In approximately 50% of the paid-peering evaluations, on average, where a potential
peer j does not satisfy the traffic ratio of i, cost-benefit-analysis by j reveals that a
mix of paid-peering and transit is more costly for j than its transit alone. Hence j
refuses to be a paid peer of i.
Similar to settlement-free peering, the cumulative costs of paid-peering and transit mix
can exceed the costs under transit alone. Figure 9 shows the total cost of traffic exchange
versus the fraction of total traffic that is diverted on a paid peering link. We find that al-
though paid-peering is priced at half the transit price, yet adoption of paid peering favors
only a small class of Tier-2 NSPs. We find that Tier-2 NSPs with the following character-
istics generally benefit from being paid-peering providers:
1. Tier-2 NSPs with very large local traffic volume (≥ 500Gbps). Their large traffic vol-
umes ensure that they can continue to use the same transit prices even after diverting
a fraction of their traffic from transit to paid-peering links.
2. Tier-2 NSPs whose local inbound traffic is much greater than local outbound traffic
which makes them attractive paid-peering providers.
3. Tier-2 NSPs which do not have large content providers as customers. Although hav-
ing large content providers as customers is beneficial for transit revenue, yet large
outbound traffic makes such transit providers unattractive for paid peering.
Furthermore, we find that having a large number of smaller customers does not turn a
Tier-2 NSP into an attractive paid-peering provider because having a large number of small
generally produces balanced traffic ratios which favor settlement-free relationships.
These results imply that the scope of economic analysis for peering decisions should
not be limited to reduction of transit costs only; instead it should also incorporate the effect
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Figure 9: Transit + Paid-Peering Cost vs. Fraction of transit traffic on a paid peering link
(monthly recurring)
4.4 Complexity of Determining the Optimal Set of Peers
In this section, we evaluate if the myopic one-by-one analysis policy for peers described in
section 1.2 is sufficient to get an optimal utility. Furthermore, we evaluate if it is feasible
for an NSP to do a combinatorial optimization of its peering set instead of doing the one-
by-one. For simplicity, we assume that NetFlow is able to provide accurate estimates of
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traffic that would be exchanged over any proposed link3.
4.4.1 Interdependence of Peering Links
We illustrate this complexity through a simple network in figure 10 where ASes i, j and
k are co-located with one another. Let i and j be two Tier-2 NSPs where i actively seeks
peers and j and k only respond to peering requests. Since k is a stub, it uses Open peering.
Furthermore let Tik  Tij . i has a choice of four distinct peering configurations shown
in the figure. Each configuration may incur different transit, paid-peering and IXP costs
and yield different paid-peering revenues. i evaluates its utility under each configuration,
beginning with configuration A shown in figure 10a.
In configuration A, i has no peers and incurs a steep transit cost for exchanging traffic
through its upstream transit providers. Let πAi be the utility of i under configuration A.
In configuration B, shown in figure 10b, i evaluates peering with j. Tik and Tki will be




Thus, j refuses settlement-free peering to i and instead offers i to become its paid-





Hence, i refuses to become paid-peering customer of j.




Since k uses Open peering policy, it accepts peering with i. Let πCi < π
A
i since i saves
on transit costs under configuration C and peering costs are generally lower than transit
costs. Hence, i peers with j.
3Suboptimal peering decisions would be even worse in the presence of limited information.
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Let i re-evaluate j in configuration D, shown in figure 10d. Now that traffic Tik + Tki
will not be routed over Lpij , the ratio computation in expression 11 no longer holds. Upon








Hence, i can acquire j as a paid-peering customer, increasing its utility. Thus, the








Thus, i had to evaluate all possible combinations of peers to determine the optimal set
of peers.
4.4.2 Infeasibility of Exhaustive Search
An NSP can use brute force approach to exhaustively search the space for all possible peer
combinations, compute its utility for each combination and determine the one that gives it
the optimal utility. Let K denote the number of peers and M the number of potential peers









yielding a complexity of O(2M) for exhaustive search of all possible combinations of
peers.
Our analysis shows that peering decisions may be intertwined with one another and
















Figure 10: Peering interdependencies
infeasible even for a modest sized NSP, which is typically co-located with a large number
of ASes at major IXPs, to compute the optimal set of peers through exhaustive search.
4.4.3 Intractability of Finding the Optimal Set of Peers
If peering with a set of ASes optimizes the utility of an AS x, then we define the set as the
optimal set of peers for x. For the special case of public peering we can show that finding
the optimal set of peers from a given set of candidate peers is NP-complete. In order to
evaluate any subset of candidate peers, x has to compute each utility component (transit
costs, peering costs, transit revenue) under that peering configuration. In order to minimize
the peering costs, peering traffic flows have to be assigned to IXP ports such that the total
cost of ports is minimized.
Let T = {t1, t2, ..., tn} be the set of traffic flows traversing all its peering links (tm > 0
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Mbps). x has to assign all traffic flows to IXP ports such that the total cost of the ports is
minimized. For simplicity, we assume that all IXP ports have the same capacity 4. Given an
IXP port p of capacity C and the set of traffic flows T , we have to find an integer number








∀k = 1, 2, ...,M . A solution is optimal if it has minimal M. The M-value for an optimal









tjxij ≤ Cyi, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
n∑
i=1
xij = 1, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
yi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
xij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
where yi = 1 if port i is used and xij = 1 if traffic flow tj is put into port i.
We can easily reduce the well-known NP-complete problem Bin-Packing to the prob-
lem of assigning traffic flows to ports, by mapping the ports to bins and traffic flows to
items in the Bin-Packing problem.
4In section 4.1 we showed that IXP ports can have distinct capacities and prices.
CHAPTER V
THE STATE OF THE INTERNET INTERDOMAIN PEERING
ECOSYSTEM (AUGUST 2010 - AUGUST 2013)
Although most of society considers the Internet as a critical infrastructure by now, we still
know surprisingly little about its dynamics and structure. Its opaqueness is due to both the
complexity of network interactions and the proprietary treatment of many aspects of these
interactions by commercial providers. One source of public data on some of these net-
work interactions that has yet to be systematically mined by researchers is PeeringDB [14].
PeeringDB [14] is an online open database where the operators of Autonomous Systems
(ASes) provide information about the networks, such as peering policies, traffic volumes
and presence at various geographic locations. PeeringDB was established in 2004 to assist
peering coordinators identifying potential peers and peering locations. Over the last 3 years
it has grown by 74% from 1950 participants in August 2010 to 3392 in August 2013.
Networks registered in PeeringDB self-report their business type, yielding a data set that
can be used directly or to validate other AS business-type inference algorithms [38, 43, 90].
Second, networks report the set of IXPs and private peering facilites at which they are
present. Third, networks self-report their general peering policy (either “Open”, “Selec-
tive”, or “Restrictive”) and approximate traffic levels. Data on these four AS properties
(business type, peering presence, traffic volume, peering policy) can help parameterize
models of interdomain interconnection economics and traffic flow ([29, ?, 62, 34], among
others). To the best of our knowledge, PeeringDB is the only centralized resource available
to the research community that publishes such data.
In this chapter we undertake a study of PeeringDB data to investigate three questions.
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First, since PeeringDB participation is voluntary, with no mechanism to verify the accu-
racy of reported information, we investigate whether the PeeringDB dataset is representa-
tive, correct, and current. We then explore PeeringDB data from the network perspective,
focusing on the geographic expanse, traffic volume, address space and peering policies
that networks advertise. Our goal is to discover correlations between these properties; the
presence of strong correlations would allow us to estimate properties of networks that are
otherwise difficult to obtain (e.g., approximate traffic levels) using a property we can es-
timate from publicly available data (e.g, size of advertised address space). Finally, we
explore what historical snapshots of the PeeringDB database can tell us about the evolution
of the Internet peering ecosytem.
We find that PeeringDB membership is representative of transit, content, and access
provider populations, and that most networks keep their records current. The data less
accurately reflects IXP properties such as member counts and their evolution over time,
because many networks in developing regions do not participate in PeeringDB. We find
strong correlations among different measures of network size – advertised address space
(from BGP), traffic volume and geographic expanse (reported on PeeringdB), and between
these size measures and the peering strategies that those networks use. The presence of
such correlations allows us to estimate difficult-to-obtain network properties, such as traf-
fic volume and peering policy, using parameters such as the BGP-advertised address space
or geographic expanse that are easier to obtain. Using three years of historical PeeringDB
snapshots, we observe the evolution of the peering ecosystem – geographic expansion by
content, access, and transit networks that agrees with their published peering behavior,
changes in traffic volume, and a shift towards more restrictive peering. Furthermore, we
find widespread adoption of Open peering among transit providers, which is counterintu-
itive given that transit providers prefer other ASes as their customers instead of peers.
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5.1 Datasets
In this chapter we analyze the latest (August 2013) snapshot from PeeringDB, which we
refer to as the Aug13-PDB dataset. Participating networks can report a wide range of
attributes that are stored as fields in its database record [14]; we use the following fields:
Business type of the network, which is one of Network Service Provider (NSP) , Ca-
ble/DSL/Access Provider, Content Provider, Enterprise, EducationResearch, or Non-Profit.
Approximate traffic volume that the network handles, which ranges from 0-20Mbps to
1+Tbps, in 14 distinct bins.
Peering strategy that the network uses: Open, Selective, or Restrictive. ASes advertising
a Restrictive peering policy are generally not inclined towards peering. ASes advertising
a Selective policy prescribe a set of criteria (overall traffic volume, traffic ratios, minimum
number of geographic locations of overlap, etc.) that potential peers must meet. ASes
advertising an Open policy are generally willing to peer with any co-located network.
The IXPs and private peering facilities where a network is present.
To examine whether PeeringDB participants are representative of the AS population,
we construct an AS topology using BGP routing table dumps from Routeviews [12] and
RIPE RIS [93] in the first week of August 2013. We use CAIDA’s AS-relationship algo-
rithm [81] to infer the number of customers of each AS. We use this BGP data to determine
the size of the address space that each AS originates (removing double-counting due to
ASes advertising overlapping prefixes). We classify ASes according to broad geographic
regions using the RIR database (WHOIS) where the AS is registered: ARIN (North Amer-
ica), RIPE (Europe, Middle East, and the former USSR), APNIC (Asia/Pacific), AfriNIC
(Africa), and LACNIC (Latin America). We refer to the dataset obtained from BGP and
WHOIS information as the Aug13-BGP dataset.
Through private communication with the PeeringDB operators we found that they do
not maintain historical snapshots of the PeeringDB data. However, they publish a nightly
mysql dump of the entire database, which we have been archiving daily since July 2010.
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the only resource of historical peering data available
to the research community. We will make this data available publicly via CAIDA’s data
sharing portal [33].
5.2 Representativeness and Usability of PeeringDB data
Given that PeeringDB runs on a volunteer basis, a key question is whether PeeringDB
participants are representative of the general AS population, and whether the data is up-to-
date and correct.
5.2.1 Business type representation of PeeringDB
We first study whether the business type of PeeringDB participants is representative of
the entire AS population. The Aug13-PDB dataset contains 3392 ASes (7.5% of the
number in Aug13-BGP), of which 31% are Network Service Providers (NSP) (Transit
Providers), 25% Content Providers, 33% Access Providers, 4% Enterprise Networks, 4%
Educational/Research, and 3% are Non-profit organizations. The Aug13-BGP dataset con-
tained 45074 ASes, of which 4.5% were Transit providers, 4.5% Content/Access/Hosting
providers, and 91% were Enterprise Customers according to our scheme for classifying
ASes into business types [38]. Based on this public BGP data, enterprise customers are
under-represented in PeeringDB as compared to transit, content and access networks.
To determine if the largest transit networks are present in PeeringDB, we use CAIDA’s
AS-rank, which ranks transit providers according to the number of ASes present in the
provider’s customer cone [81]. We find that 93% of the top-100, 80% of the top-200 and
74% of the top-300 ASes from AS-rank were present in the Aug13-PDB dataset, including
all known Tier-1 [6] and major Tier-2 ASes [7]. To determine whether popular content
providers are present in PeeringDB, we used Alexa’s ranking of major content sites in Au-
gust 2013 [2] to find the ASes that host the most popular websites. 59% of ASes hosting the
top-100, 39% of ASes hosting the top-500 and 38% of ASes hosting the top-1000 websites
were present in Aug13-PDB. To determine whether popular access providers are present
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in PeeringDB, we crawled the tracker for the popular torrent site The Pirate Bay [11] over
two weeks in July 2013, and obtained a list of IP addresses that connected to the tracker.
We then mapped those IP addreses to ASes, and ranked ASes by the number of BitTorrent
clients. We find that 54% of the top-100 ASes in terms of host count, 52% of the top-200,
and 47% of the top-300 ASes were present in Aug13-PDB.
Limitations of AS representation in PeeringDB: Given that the objective of Peer-
ingDB is to assist peering coordinators, it is likely to draw the attention of only that section
of the network operator community that is interested in peering. Hence, we can expect
organizations whose primary business is not Internet connectivity, e.g., education/research,
retail enterprises, etc., networks with small traffic volumes, limited resources, small geo-
graphic footprint, to not appear in PeeringDB. Finally, some networks may not be willing
to share information about themselves due to competitive reasons. This is evident as there
were 8724 registered users in the Aug13-PDB dataset but only 3392 ASes that volunteered
any information about themselves.
5.2.2 Geographical representation of PeeringDB
Our next question is whether the geographic distribution of PeeringDB participants matches
that of all ASes seen in BGP. To answer this question we used WHOIS information to de-
termine the RIR that each AS in peeringDB is registered in, and we compared that with the
distribution for all ASes. The first two columns of Table 3 show the fraction of ASes in the
Aug13-PDB and Aug13-BGP datasets associated with each registry. The APNIC, LAC-
NIC, and AFRINIC registries have almost the same representation in the Aug13-PDB and
Aug13-BGP datasets. RIPE, however, is over-represented and ARIN is under-represented
in Aug13-PDB. Since PeeringDB membership is not representative of the entire AS pop-
ulation (most of which are stub networks [38]), we isolate the geographic distribution of
non-stub networks in the two rightmost columns of Table 3. For this non-stub population,
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Table 3: Geographical distribution of ASes in the Aug13-PDB and Aug13-BGP datasets.
While the overall PeeringDB population is biased towards RIPE, the PeeringDB non-stub
population is geographicly representative of the entire Internet.
Registry Aug13-PDB BGP Aug13-PDB BGP
All (%) All (%) Non-stubs (%) Non-stubs (%)
ARIN 25.1 34.9 24.0 26.8
RIPE 53.2 44.2 53.6 49.8
APNIC 13.4 12.3 15.3 13.7
LACNIC 4.9 6.2 5.1 7.4
AFRINIC 1.7 1.5 1.7 2.1
the representation bias towards RIPE (over ARIN) is much lower; the geographic charac-
teristics of non-stub PeeringDB participants are thus similar to those of the larger Internet.
5.2.3 Freshness of PeeringDB records
Using the last updated field in PeeringDB records in the Aug 1, 2013 snapshot, we find
that the median time since the last update was between 10-14 months for NSPs, Ca-
ble/DSL/Access providers and Content providers, and 17 months for Enterprise networks.
When we considered the top-20 NSPs, top-20 Content and top-20 Access providers (ranked
according to their advertised traffic volume), 70% of this set had updated their peeringDB
records in the month preceding August 1, 2013. PeeringDB records thus appear to be rea-
sonably current. PeeringDB does not incorporate topology data, which is more susceptible
to frequent variation. We do not expect peering policies, geographic co-location and traffic
profiles to change frequently.
5.2.4 Correctness of data reported in PeeringDB
Snijders [100] recently found that PeeringDB data was 99% accurate with respect to net-
work presence at IXPs, i.e., 99% of the instances where a network reported presence at
an IXP were true. To check the consistency of peering policies that networks report on
PeeringDB and on their webpages, we obtained the peering policy URLs of 50 networks
in PeeringDB, and compared the policy seen on their URL with the policy mentioned in
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the PeeringDB record. In each case, the peering policy listed on PeeringDB (Open, Se-
lective or Restrictive) matched the peering policy at that network’s policy URL. Verifying
other self-reported network properties such as traffic volume is difficult; however, we are
currently developing a method to compare a network’s advertised peering policy with its
peering behavior at various IXP route servers.
We investigated whether we could use PeeringDB to infer a specific IXP property –
the number of members present at that IXP. For each of the top-20 IXPs for which we
could find member lists online, we calculated a ratio of the number of members of the IXP
inferred from PeeringDB to the number of members obtained from the IXP’s webpage. If
a network does not participate in PeeringDB but is present at an IXP, then that network
does not appear in the member list created from PeeringDB. Consequently, for each of the
top-20 IXPs, this ratio is less than 1; the median is 0.8. For some IXPs this ratio is close to
1 , e.g, LINX Extreme LAN (0.99), LINX Juniper LAN (0.98), Seattle Internet Exchange
(0.98); these IXPs encourage their members to join PeeringDB. For many IXPs the ratio is
small, especially in developing regions, e.g., Moscow IX (0.25), PTT Sao Paolo (0.32) and
Hong Kong IX (0.62). We conclude that IXP member counts from PeeringDB are a lower
bound on the number of networks present at the IXP; they are not complete membership
lists. Consequently, PeeringDB should not be used to estimate the size (in terms of member
count), or the diversity of the participants at an IXP, unless we first verify that the member
list generated from PeeringDB is close to that obtained from the IXP iteself.
5.3 Properties of participants
We explore the use of PeeringDB to infer properties of networks that are difficult to obtain
from other sources. We focus on three measures of a network’s size – geographic expanse
(the number of IXPs and private peering facilities), advertised traffic volume, and BGP-
advertised IPv4 address space. Networks self-report the first two properties in PeeringDB;
we obtain the size of the IPv4 address space from publicly available BGP data. Metrics
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of the size and geographic expanse of networks are important for developing, parameter-
ing, and evaluating models of interdomain economics and interconnection [29, ?, 62, 34].
Moreover, the presence of strong correlations between these properties would enable us
to estimate a network property that is difficult to measure (e.g., traffic volume) using a
property that is more readily available (advertised address space, or number of peering
locations).
Geographical expanse: Figure 11 shows the distribution of the number of IXPs and private
peering facilities where participating networks (classified according to their self-reported
business type) are present. Unsurprisingly, the self-reported data indicates that NSPs tend to
have presence at more IXPs (median=2 and 90th percentile=8) and private peering facilities
(median=2 and 90th percentile=9) than other network types. The median number of IXPs
for Enterprise, Content and Access networks is a single IXP, while the 90th percentile is 2
for Enterprise networks and 4 for Content and Access networks. More surprising is that the
presence of Enterprise networks at private peering facilities is comparable to that of content
and access providers; in each category, the median is a single facility and 90th percentile
is 5 facilities. Conventional wisdom suggests that enterprise networks are usually stubs
at the edge of the network that do not engage in widespread peering. While the sample
of Enterprise networks in PeeringDB is small (only 120 networks), and contains networks
such as Amazon and Websense Hosted Security that peer at many locations, it suggests a
trend toward richer peering at the periphery of the Internet.
Relation between geographic expanse and traffic volume: We examine the correlation
between the geographic expanse of a network (the number of IXPs and private peering fa-
cilities) and the advertised traffic volume of that network. Figure 12 bins the total number
of locations where a network is present, and shows the distribution of the traffic volume
of networks in each bin. In general, the number of locations where a network is present at
positively correlates with its advertised traffic volume. The fraction of networks advertis-
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Figure 11: Distribution of the number of IXPs and private peering facilities at whcih
PeeringDB participants are present. NSPs are generally present at the largest number of

























Figure 12: Number of locations at which a network is present vs. self-reported traffic
volume. Networks present at more locations are more likely to advertise larger traffic
volumes. Total number of networks in each category given in paranthesis.
locations. The number of peering locations of a network is usually easier to discover than
its traffic volume, and the correlation between these factors suggests that we may be able
to roughly estimate the latter based on the former.
Relation between traffic volume and advertised address space: Figure 13 shows the
median, 10th and 90th percentiles of the advertised address space size for each advertised
traffic volume for different classes of networks. Access and enterprise networks have the
largest median advertised address space for each traffic volume, with strong correlation
















































































































































Figure 13: Reported traffic volume of a network and its advertised address space size.
Networks advertising more address space also report higher traffic volumes.
Access/Enterprise networks advertise more address space per unit of traffic than transit
and content networks.
address space for each traffic volume with weaker correlation (correlation coefficient 0.56).
NSPs show the strongest correlation coefficient (0.95) betwen advertised traffic volume and
advertised address space, but lower median values than access and enterprise networks.
These trends match what we expect from these business types. Access and enterprise net-
works serve end-users, and their traffic volume typically increases with the size of their
advertised address space; in contrast, content providers do not require much address space
to serve content. Since a network’s BGP-advertised address space is computable from
public data, its strong correlation (for access, enterprise and transit networks) with traffic
volume suggests that we may be able to use BGP data to estimate the approximate traffic
volume of other networks on the Internet.
Changes in the traffic volume of participating networks: Given that reported global
traffic levels in the Internet continue to increase rapidly [32], we expect that most net-
works should advertise larger traffic volumes over time. For PeeringDB snapshots between
August 2010 and 2013, 35% of access providers, 42% of content providers, and 29% of
transit networks reported a decrease in their traffic volume. We do not know whether this
decrease is due to a loss of customers, or consolidation in the content delivery and ac-
cess markets [66]. Another plausible hypothesis is that networks initially advertise inflated
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traffic volumes to peer with large networks. Over time, however, networks are able to
determine the actual traffic volumes being exchanged with their peers. Hence, networks
advertising inflated traffic volumes may realize that doing so only leads to unstable peer-
ing relationships and drives away peers with whom they could have formed stable links.
Therefore, they report figures closer to reality. Correlating observed changes in traffic vol-
ume with publicly available financial information about revenues and incomes could help
identify cases where traffic volume changes are due to factors such as loss of market share
(as opposed to changes due to more truthful reporting). Such actual changes of traffic vol-
ume may help researchers validate models that relate traffic flow to economics and strategic
decisions of network.
Geographical expansion by networks: Researchers have studied the geographic expan-
sion of networks, and the resulting flattening of the Internet topology [53, ?]. Historical
peeringDB snapshots allow us to estimate the geographic expansion by participating net-
works. Of 2,525 networks present in both Aug 2010 and Aug 2013, 25% increased their
presence at IXPs, and 25% increased their presence at private peering facilities. When clas-
sified by business type, 33% of NSPs present in both snapshots increased their presence at
IXPs and 37% did so at private peering facilities. The increase at peering locations was
24% and 31% for Content providers, and 28% and 31% for Cable/Access/DSL providers.
The following case studies from each business type illuminate the changing structure of the
ecosystem.
Content providers: From 2010 to 2013, Google increased its peering presence from 57 to
72 IXPs and from 58 to 77 private facilities. Akamai’s presence at private peering facil-
ities is almost constant (35 in 2010 to 36 in 2013), while its presence at IXPs increased
from 47 to 74. Limelight Networks’ presence at IXPs remained constant at 42, while it
expanded its presence at private facilities from 55 to 65. These observations are consistent
with well-documented peering policies of these networks [55, 20], i.e., engage in Open
peering at IXPs for low-traffic peers and private peering for high-traffic peers. In contrast,
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Limelight Networks advertises a Selective peering policy requiring a minimum of 1Gbps
of traffic [71], implying that it prefers private peering with qualifying networks. The ge-
ographic expansion of Netflix follows its growth as a major source of Internet traffic. In
2010, Netflix was present at one IXP and one private peering facility; in 2013, it is present
at 21 IXPs and 27 private peering facilities.
Access Providers: Major access providers, e.g., Comcast, Time Warner Cable, Vodafone
and ClaraNet announce Selective or Restrictive peering policies. Vodafone and Claranet
decreased their IXP presence between 2010 and 2013 (from 7 to 5 and 15 to 11, respec-
tively), while Comcast did not report presence at any IXPs since 2010 (and was present at
17 private facilities in 2013). Time Warner Cable reduced its private peering locations from
12 to 10 and added a single IXP between 2010 and 2013.
Transit Providers: Large transit providers, e.g., AT&T, Level3, Global Crossing (Now
Level3), TiNet, TeliaSonera, Deutsche Telekom and TATA announce Restrictive or Selec-
tive policies. AT&T and Level3 are not present at any IXP or private peering facility;
presumably they prefer to peer at their own facilities. Tinet, Deutsche Telekom, TATA, and
TeliaSonera have all decreased their presence at IXPs and increased their private peering
count from 2010 to 2013. Hurricane Electric is an interesting exception; it advertises an
Open peering policy, and has increased its IXP and private peering count (from 43 to 68
and 27 to 58, respectively).
Network presence at multi-IXP cities: PeeringDB lists 59 cities with more than one IXP.
For networks in multi-IXP cities, peering at multiple IXPs could increase the diversity of
peering partners and resiliency of interconnection. For each multi-IXP city with 4 or more
IXPs, Figure 14 shows the fraction of networks present in that city that connect to a given
number of IXPs. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there are significant differences between cities;
in Chicago, Montreal, and Singapore, close to 90% of the networks are present at a single
IXP in that city. London and Paris, on the other hand, present the opposite case, where 40%
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Hong Kong, 5 IXPs
New York, 6 IXPs
Tokyo, 6 IXPs
Figure 14: For each multi-IXP city with 4 or more IXPs, the fraction of networks that are
present at different numbers of IXPs.
different multi-IXP cities peer differently involves looking into the size, business model,
and diversity of the participant mix at these different IXPs, which we plan to do in future
work.
5.4 Advertised Peering Policies
Network presence at IXPs is a measure of the ability of networks to peer with other co-
located networks, but says nothing about their willingness to do so. Peering policies adver-
tised in PeeringDB can serve as a coarse measure of peering openness. We emphasize that
a network is under no obligation to follow its announced peering policy. At the same time
it is unlikely that networks can derive any advantage by advertising a completely different
peering policy than what they follow in practice. For example, a network implementing
Open policy would only drive potential peers away by advertising a Selective policy. Sim-
ilarly, a network implementing Selective policy while advertising Open will form many
unstable peering links as most links will fail to qualify its satisfy its peering constraints.
Nevertheless, the peering policies in PeeringDB should be viewed as a coarse measure of
peering openness, as many networks also require that their peers follow additional con-
straints, e.g., co-location at more than one IXP, traffic volume exchanged between peers,
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Table 4: Peering strategy distribution by network type. Open peering is the dominant
peering strategy irrespective of business type.
Type Total Open (%) Selective (%) Restrictive (%)
NSP 1064 66.7 28.7 4.5
Content 843 83.9 14.4 1.5
Access 1122 79.1 18.5 2.3
Enterprise 120 65.0 27.5 7.5
Edu/Research 133 69.1 28.5 2.2
Non-profit 108 81.4 14.8 3.7
24/7 operator support, etc. Another reason for deviation from advertised peering policies
is due to the complexities of implementing import/export filters to enforce these policies
when a network connects to an IXP’s route server. Giotsas et al. [54] found that some net-
works advertising a Selective peering policy in PeeringDB were actually engaging in open
peering at some IXPs, due to the complexity of setting fine-grained import/export policies
at the corresponding route server.
Of the 3392 ASes in the Aug13-PDB dataset, 76% use Open peering, 21% use Se-
lective, and 3% use Restrictive. We examine whether this preference for Open peering
depends on other properties of these networks such as their business type, or the measures
of network size (geographic expanse, approximate traffic volume).
Peering strategy distribution by business type: Table 4 shows the fraction of networks
in each business type that advertise Open, Selective and Restrictive peering. Interestingly,
the peering strategy distribution does not depend significantly on the AS business type.
Between 65% to 84% of ASes from each business type advertise an Open peering strategy.
The popularity of Open peering is counterintuitive, especially for transit providers, who
could mostly use Selective or Restrictive peering to increase their customer base and transit
revenues. The trend towards Open peering is not limited to small transit providers; 32%
of NSPs with traffic volume greater than 100 Gbps, 43% of providers with traffic volume
































































































Figure 15: Peering strategy distribution of transit, content, and access providers –
classification by traffic volume. Peering openness of transit and access networks is
negatively correlated with geographic expanse. There is no such correlation for content
providers.
Peering strategy distribution by traffic volume: Figure 15 shows the peering strategy
distribution for NSPs, content providers, and access providers that advertise a given traffic
volume. For NSPs and access providers the preference for Open peering gradually de-
creases as the AS’s traffic volume increases. Low volume NSPs and access providers show
a strong preference for Open peering; 80% of 415 NSPs and 87% of 603 access providers
advertising traffic volume less than 5Gbps announce Open peering policy. On the other
hand, only 1 out of 5 NSPs and 2 out of 18 access providers advertising more than 1 Tbps
of traffic declare an Open peering policy. Content providers have a weaker relation between
traffic volume and peering policy; 88% of 573 content providers with less than 1Tbps of
traffic announce Open peering. Of 8 content providers with more than 1Tbps of traffic, 4
announce Open peering, and none announce Restrictive peering.
Peering strategy distribution – joint classification by traffic volume and number of
customers: Transit providers (and also to some extent access providers, e.g. Comcast),
rely on transit customers as a source of revenue. For these providers, peering openly could
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Table 5: Peering strategy distribution of transit and access providers – joint classification
by number of transit customers and traffic volume. Transit providers with low traffic and
few customers are most likely to adopt Open peering; providers with large traffic and
many customers are least likely.
Class Total Open (%) Selective (%) Restrictive(%)
Class-1 (ST+SC) 891 84.8 14.0 1.1
Class-2 (ST+LC) 19 57.9 36.8 5.3
Class-3 (LT+SC) 310 74.5 21.0 4.5
Class-4 (LT+LC) 344 46.8 45.3 7.6
mean losing revenue-generating customers. We use traffic volume and size of customer
base to consider four classes of ASes:
Class-1: Small traffic volume, small number of customers (ST+SC)
Class-2: Small traffic volume, large number of customers (ST+LC)
Class-3: Large traffic volume, small number of customers (LT+SC)
Class-4: Large traffic volume, large number of customers (LT+LC)
Class-1 contains networks in the bottom 30% by traffic volume and bottom 30% by number
of customers; Class-2 contains networks in the bottom 30% by traffic volume and top 70%
by number of customers; other clases are defined similarly. Table 5 shows the peering
strategy distribution for these four classes of ASes. Open peering is most common in
Class-1 networks (85% of such ASes use Open peering) and is least popular for Class-4
ASes. However, 47% of even Class-4 ASes advertise Open peering. Using game-theoretic
analysis and agent-based simulations, we have shown [75, 78] that transit providers can
gravitate towards Open peering due to myopic decision making without coordination. Our
results also showed that in a world with widespread Open peering, networks in Class-1
stand to gain, while networks in Class-4 stand to lose. The distribution of peering policies
seen in the real world is consistent with our previous results [75, 78].
Peering strategy distribution by geographic expanse: Figure 16 shows the peering strat-

























































Figure 16: Peering strategy distribution of NSPs, Content, and Access providers by
geographic expanse. Peering openness of NSPs and access networks is negatively
correlated with traffic volume. We find no such correlation for content providers.
expanse (the number of IXPs at which they are present). Similar to the earlier classifi-
cation by traffic volume, the peering strategy of content providers is largely independent
of geographic expanse; these ASes mostly prefer Open peering independent of their size.
The strategy distribution of NSPs and access networks strongly correlates with geographic
expanse; the fraction of networks that announce an Open peering policy decreases with
geographic expanse.
Strategy transitions: Between August 2010 and August 2013, 130 ASes in PeeringDB
changed their peering strategy. Surprisingly, given the prevalence of Open peering, most
(70%) of networks that changed their peering strategy moved towards a more selective
strategy. When classified by self-reported business type, among these 130 ASes, 71%
of access providers, 52% of content providers, and 80% of transit providers became more
selective in their peering. When classified by traffic volume, 61% of networks with reported
traffic less than 1Gbps, 81% of networks with 1-100Gbps and 83% of networks with more
than 100Gbps became more selective in their peering policies. A plausible hypothesis for
the change towards more selective peering is that these ASes became less profitable due to
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Open peering, causing them to revert back. This shift may also be evidence of the “peering
life cycle” [86], where networks initially advertise an Open peering policy and then become
more selective with time.
CHAPTER VI
A PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THE GRAVITATION
TOWARDS OPEN PEERING BY INTERNET TRANSIT
PROVIDERS
In this chapter we explore the peering behavior of transit providers and challenges the
conventional notion that peering is always economically beneficial. We show that myopic
and selfish adoption of peering strategies, and lack of coordination among transit providers
can push transit providers towards Open peering. We also explain why transit providers
may find it difficult to break out of the stable, but suboptimal, equilibria formed through
Open peering.
The economic objective of peering is to reduce upstream transit costs. To a large de-
gree, each AS X follows a peering strategy (or “peering policy”1) that is used to determine
whether X will accept to peer with another AS Y. Even though they can vary widely in
their details, most peering strategies can be grouped in three distinct classes: Restrictive
(X peers only if necessary to avoid Internet partitioning; typically used by Tier-1 transit
providers), Selective (X peers only with ASes that are comparable with X, a notion that we
will define more precisely in Section 6.1), and Open (X is willing to peer with everyone,
except its customers). The conventional wisdom is that transit providers use Restrictive or
Selective peering, so that they can engage other ASes as their customers, thus increasing
their transit revenues.
In the last few years, however, there is evidence that the Internet peering ecosystem
is going through a major transformation from more restrictive or selective to more open
interconnection. A recent study on peering interconnectivity at a large European Internet
1We use these two terms interchangeably.
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Exchange Point (IXP) reveals a “rich peering fabric”, with 67% of all possible peering
relationships established at the IXP [19]. Such interconnectivity characteristics can only
arise if a large percentage of ASes present at the IXP engages in Open peering. We have
analyzed data from PeeringDB [14], an online database where peering coordinators pro-
vide information about their ASes. This data shows that most transit and access providers
(70-80%) use the Open peering strategy. This is counterintuitive, especially for transit
providers, because if they peer openly how can they attract new customers or keep their
existing ones? More surprisingly, this trend is not limited to small transit providers. The
PeeringDB dataset reveals that 36% of transit providers with traffic volume greater than
100 Gbps (e.g., Hurricane Electric), 37% of providers with traffic volume between 50 and
100 Gbps (e.g., WIND Telecomunicazioni S.P.A.) and 66% of providers with global scope
(e.g., DeltaTelecom) use Open peering. Furthermore, the findings of a recent survey show
that 99.5% of peering relationships are formed without formal analysis or agreements [10].
These observations on peering behavior raise some important questions: Why do so
many transit providers use Open peering? What are the underlying interconnectivity dy-
namics that influence their peering decisions? What does this attraction towards Open
peering imply for the economic performance of transit providers? Is the inclination to-
wards Open peering uniform across all categories of transit providers? In the absence of
any formal analysis for most peering agreements, the network-wide economic impact of
peering on transit providers is not well understood. Furthermore, Internet providers, inde-
pendent of their type, are secretive about their economic objectives and operational data.
Hence, we cannot address the previously mentioned questions empirically. Instead, we rely











For the first part of this chapter, we use a much simplified version of our default model to
ensure analytic tractability. The underlying basis of the model, however, remains the same.
The network model, shown in Figure 17, consists of five nodes: i, j, g, w, x and y.
The nodes represent ASes that seek to optimize their utility by choosing the best peering
strategy. w, x and y are stubs i.e., they do not have transit customers; they openly peer
with any node that is willing to peer with them to minimize their transit costs. Node g is a
tier-1 transit provider that uses the Restrictive peering policy, and so it does not peer with
any other node. Its presence in the model is only to ensure that there is at least one path
between any two nodes even if there are no peering links. i and j are transit providers that
choose dynamically the peering strategy that maximizes their economic utility; these two
nodes are the only players in the following repeated game.
Link formation and traffic routing: Nodes interconnect through one of two types of
links: (a) customer-provider or transit links, and (b) peering links. Players i and j are
customers of g; w, x and y are customers of g, i and j respectively. The customer-provider
links remain fixed during the following game. However, peering links change as i and j
adopt different peering policies, as explained later. We denote the link between any two
nodes p and q by Lpq.
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Only geographically co-located nodes can form links. The stubs w, x and y are not
co-located. All other players are co-located and can form links with each other.
Traffic and routing: The traffic flow (Mbps) sent from node p to q is denoted by Tpq. We
denote the total traffic exchanged between p and q by Vpq,
Vpq = Tpq + Tqp (17)
The total traffic of a node p, denoted by V̂p, is the sum of all traffic that p exchanges with
other nodes.
Traffic follows the shortest path subject to two common policy constraints in the In-
ternet [?]: “prefer customer over peer over provider links” and the “valley-free” routing
property. If two nodes cannot exchange traffic directly over a peering link, they have to
rely on an upstream transit provider to carry their traffic. For instance, in Figure 17, x
exchanges traffic with w through its transit provider i; however, i exchanges traffic with w
directly over their peering link instead of going through its transit provider g.
Peering strategies: Nodes form bilateral peering relationships based on their peering
strategies. sp denotes the peering policy of a node p. We consider the following three
peering strategies, based on the policies that are announced at PeeringDB [14] and that are
widely discussed at NANOG [8] and peering surveys [1]:
1. Restrictive (R): Node p does not peer with any other node unless it is necessary to
avoid network partitioning.
2. Selective (S): Node p only peers with nodes that have similar (or larger) size than
itself. We use the total traffic of a node as a proxy for its size. The rationale is that
if a node q is much smaller than p, in terms of total traffic, then p would prefer to
become a transit provider of q as opposed to a peer of q. Iσ(p, q) = 1 denotes that q
satisfies the Selective peering constraint of p, stated as follows





Table 6: Peers of i and j under different peering strategies
sp
Peers of i Peers of j
Iσ(i, w) = 1 Iσ(i, w) = 0 Iσ(j, w) = 1 Iσ(j, w) = 0
R ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
S j, w j i, w i
O j, w, y j, w, y i, w, x i, w, x
where σ denotes the Selective traffic ratio constraint (σ ≥ 1), Otherwise, Iσ(p, q) =
0.
3. Open (O): Node p peers with all co-located nodes except its existing customers.
Due to space constraints, we further assume the following two conditions so that the
analysis focuses on the more interesting instances of the game. First, transit providers i and
j satisfy each other’s Selective peering constraint, i.e., Iσ(i, j) = 1 and Iσ(j, i) = 1 for the
given value of σ, and so they always peer with each other. If this was not true, the providers
i and j would be attracted to Open peering even more. Second, the traffic of stubs x and y
are such that Iσ(i, y) = 0 and Iσ(j, x) = 0, i.e., they do not qualify to become peers of j
and i, respectively. If this was not true, a provider would simply use Selective peering if w
qualifies to become its peer, and Open otherwise. Recall that stubs, w, x and y peer openly
with any player willing to peer with them.
Costs and revenues: Each provider v charges its transit customers a price of Pv $/Mbps.
For instance, if player i exchanges traffic V with its provider g, i incurs a transit cost2 CTi ,
CTi = Pg × V (19)
The transit revenue of i, denoted by Ri, is the transit cost incurred by its (only) customer x.
Peering also incurs a cost. If V ′ is the total peering traffic of player i, its peering cost is
given by:
CPi = α× V ′ (20)
2We use a linear cost and revenue model in this section. The simulation model in Section 6.2 uses a more
realistic nonlinear function that captures economies of scale.
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where α is the peering cost factor ($/Mbps).




j = Pg × (Vjw + Vwy) + α× (Vij + Vjx + Viy + Vxy) (21)
Similarly, j’s revenue is given by:
Rj = Pj × (Vjy + Vwy + Viy + Vxy) (22)
In practice, peering is much cheaper than transit, meaning that α Pv for any provider
v.
Utility: The peering strategies si and sj determine the interdomain topology of the un-
derlying network (who is peering with whom), and thus the traffic flow on each transit and
peering link. These traffic volumes then determine the utility of each player. So, we ex-
press the utility of each player p as a function of the peering policies of i and j: up(si, sj),
p ∈ {i, j}. The strategy space of each player consists of the three previous strategies
(R, S,O) and is denoted by S.
The utility of player p is its revenue minus its transit and peering costs,
up(si, sj) = Rp − CTp − CPp (23)
where the revenue and cost terms are calculated as previously described.
Repeated game: Network formation takes place in discrete time (“rounds”), with players i
and j playing one after the other. Without loss of generality, the game starts with i’s action.
The initial condition of the game is the pair of peering strategies (s0i , s
0
j) at t=0, which also
determines the initial topology. In each round, a player computes its own utility under each
of the three candidate peering strategies, and selects the peering strategy that maximizes its
utility at that time. In other words, each player acts myopically based on the information
that it currently has, without trying to predict the actions of other players in future rounds
(“best-response dynamics”) and without trying to coordinate with other players.
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Specifically, when player p plays at time t, p selects the policy stp that maximizes its
own utility, given the policy selection of the other player (−p) in the previous round. Thus,








We assume that if two strategies give the same utility, the player will choose the strategy
that results in the minimum number of peering links (a more manageable configuration in
practice). In other words, we break any ties in favor of first the Restrictive and then the
Selective strategy.
The game terminates if the network reaches a Nash equilibrium, meaning that none
of the two players can increase its utility by unilaterally switching to a different peering
strategy. So, the strategy pair (s∗p, s
∗





−p) ≥ up(sp, s∗−p) ∀sp ∈ S (25)
6.1.2 Stability and Equilibria
The initial strategy vector (s0i , s
0
j) can take nine possible values, given that Sp = {R, S,O}
and p ∈ {i, j}. It is easy to see that the Restrictive strategy is always dominated by the
Selective and Open strategies for both i and j. Hence, we do not show the utility under the
Restrictive strategy and focus on the remaining four initial strategy vectors. For each such
vector we need to consider separately whether w qualifies to be a peer of each provider
under the Selective strategy, i.e., whether Iσ(p, w) = 1 or not for p ∈ {i, j} (four cases).
So, overall there are 16 possible cases that need to be analyzed.
We have confirmed that the previous repeated game converges to a Nash equilibrium in
all cases. Further, as shown in Section 6.1.3, there are only two possible equilibria: (S, S)
and (O,O). In other words, eventually both providers use either the Selective or the Open
strategy. It is possible to explain the gravitation towards Open peering through the simple
one-shot game equilibria. However, that does not capture all the cases in which the network
converges to Open peering.
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6.1.3 Best-Response Dynamics
In this section, we analyze the game in detail, focusing on the sequence of peering decisions
by each provider, for the most interesting of the previous 16 cases.
6.1.3.1 (s0i , s
0
j ) = (S,S), Iσ(i,w) = 1, Iσ(j,w) = 1
We first consider the case thatw qualifies to be a peer of i and j under Selective peering.
Player i plays first and evaluates all peering strategies. Switching to Open does not increase
i’s utility because that provider can peer with both w and j under the Selective strategy, and
so it can reach everyone (except g) through its peering links. Thus,
ui(S, S)− ui(O, S) = 0 (26)
j carries out the same analysis and also decides to stay with the Selective strategy. So the
resulting equilibrium is (S, S).
An example of this case is when major content providers such as Google or Facebook
(w in the model) have sufficiently large traffic volume to peer with transit providers that
use the Selective strategy. Non-tier-1 transit providers (i and j in the model) peer with
such content providers, resulting in lower transit costs for both the content provider and the
transit provider.
6.1.3.2 (s0i , s
0
j ) = (S,S), Iσ(i,w) = 0, Iσ(j,w) = 1
We now consider the case that w does not qualify to be a peer of i when si = S, but
it qualifies to be a peer of j when sj = S.3 In this case, i finds that Open dominates the
Selective strategy,
ui(O, S)− ui(S, S) = (Pg − α)× (Viw + Vwx) ≥ 0 (27)









(b) Network after j plays
Figure 18: Network formation in Case-2
because of the reduction in transit costs when the traffic that it exchanges with w is routed
through a peering link; recall that Pg > α (transit is more expensive than peering).
Under the Open strategy however, i will also peer with y, the customer of j. The
resulting network is shown in Figure 18a. Note that, as a result of the peering link between
i and y, provider j now loses the revenue that was due to the traffic Viy + Vxy; that traffic
now bypasses j.
When it is j’s turn to play, it also finds that Open dominates Selective,
uj(O,O)− uj(O, S) = (Pj − α)× Txy ≥ 0 (28)
Note that the Open strategy is better for j even though it was able to exchange traffic with
i, x and w through peering links even under the Selective strategy. The reason is that if j
uses Open peering it can directly peer with x, and so the traffic from x to y, Txy, will be
routed again through j, partially alleviating j’s earlier loss in revenue. On the other hand,
the traffic flow from y to x, Tyx still bypasses j through the peering link Liy. Thus, j also
adopts the Open strategy, it peers with x, and the new strategy vector becomes (O,O).
When the two players play again, they find that any unilateral deviation from the Open
strategy would reduce their utility:
ui(O,O)− ui(S,O) = (Pi − α)× Tyx (29)
+ (Pg − α)× (Viw + Vwx) ≥ 0
uj(O,O)− uj(O, S) = (Pj − α)× Txy ≥ 0 (30)
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Thus, the network reaches the equilibrium (O,O).
The net difference in i’s utility between the start of the game and this equilibrium is
given by
ui(S, S)− ui(O,O) = (Pi − α)× (Vjx + Txy) (31)
− (Pg − α)× (Viw + Vwx)
i’s utility at equilibrium may be less than its initial utility. When i adopts the Open strategy,
it peers not only with w (to reduce its upstream peering costs) but also with j’s customers,
thereby diverting part of j’s customer traffic directly to i. Then, j also adopts Open peering
so that it can partially alleviate this loss in transit revenue. In doing so, j diverts part of i’s
customer traffic directly to j. Hence, while i initially benefits from a reduction in transit
costs, it finally also suffers a loss in transit revenue. The net effect on the utility of i and j
depends on the relation between the transit prices of the involved providers and the relative
size of the affected traffic flows.
Effect of traffic volume: Let us further discuss the role of the traffic that i and its cus-
tomers exchange with w (Viw + Vwx in Equation 31), and the traffic that i’s customers
exchange with j and its customers (Vjx + Txy in Equation 31). The former is traffic for
which i saves transit costs by peering with w, while the latter is traffic for which i loses
revenue when j adopts Open peering.
As a first-order approximation, we can assume that the transit price of all providers is
roughly the same, perhaps due to competition (i.e., Pi ≈ Pj ≈ Pg). Then, according to
Equation 31, Selective peering is preferred if (Vjx + Txy)  (Viw + Vwx). This situation
would arise if x is a much larger content provider than w. i cannot afford to lose the transit
revenue from its existing customer x, which is what would happen if both providers use
Open peering.
If, however, (Viw + Vwx)  (Vjx + Txy), then switching to Open peering is preferred.
Such a situation can arise if w is a much larger content provider than i’s customers, and
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so i would incur a large transit cost if not peering with w. Although i’s adoption of Open
peering forces j to adopt Open peering as well (resulting in a reduction of i’s revenue), this
revenue loss is much smaller than the upstream transit cost that i would have incurred by
not peering with w.
Similar considerations apply to j.
6.1.3.3 (s0i , s
0
j ) = (S,S), Iσ(i,w) = 0, Iσ(j,w) = 0
This case also results in the (O,O) equilibrium. i initially adopts the Open strategy to
reduce upstream transit costs. j adopts Open peering to reduce its own upstream transit
costs or to recover lost revenue, as explained in Section 6.1.3.2. The analysis of the rest of
the game is the same as in Section 6.1.3.2.
6.1.3.4 (s0i , s
0
j ) = (O,O), Iσ(i,w) = 1, Iσ(j,w) = 1
In this case, w qualifies to be a peer of both i and j under Selective peering. However,
both players start from the Open strategy. The initial network for this game is shown in Fig-
ure 18b. i can avoid any upstream transit cost with the Selective strategy since Iσ(i, w) = 1.
However, if i adopts Selective peering, it would need to depeer y leading to a loss in rev-
enue because of the flow Tyx, as shown in Equation 29. Consequently, i stays with the
Open strategy. j acts in the same manner. Neither player changes its peering strategy and
the equilibrium is (O,O).
The equilibrium (O,O) is suboptimal for both i and j. In the case of i, for instance,
ui(S, S)− ui(O,O) = Pi × Vjx + (Pi − α)× Txy ≥ 0 (32)
Note that the peering constraints on w in this case are the same as in Section 6.1.3.1, but
the initial peering strategies are different. While the game of Section 6.1.3.1 reaches the
optimal equilibrium (S, S), this game stays at the suboptimal equilibrium (O,O).
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6.1.4 Peer Preference or Peer Pressure?
We summarize and generalize the effect that was observed in the previous game as follows:
a transit provider may decide to switch to Open peering to reduce its upstream transit
costs. By doing so, it can form peering links with at least some customers of its existing
peers, diverting revenue-generating traffic from the latter. Those peers would then have
the incentive to also switch to Open peering so that they can partially alleviate their lost
revenue by attracting traffic that is destined to their customers through direct peering links
with others. Thus, transit providers can end up in a state where the loss in transit revenues
is larger than their savings in upstream transit costs.
Instead of adopting Open peering to reduce upstream transit costs (“peer preference”)
some transit providers may be forced to do so to partially alleviate the transit revenue
loss caused by their peers (“peer pressure”). We showed that the resulting Open peering
equlibrium may be suboptimal for transit providers.
The gravitation of transit providers towards Open peering occurs due to (a) myopic
behavior and (b) lack of coordination among peering transit providers. For example, in
case 6.1.3.3 i myopically decides to keep the peering link Liy; otherwise the removal of
that link would have reduced its utility. Had i switched to Selective peering, accepting a
short-term loss, j would find the contentious link Ljx redundant and it would also switch
to Selective. In other words, players i and j peer with y and x, respectively, not out of
preference but because of the pressure to avoid short-term loss.
One could argue that our assumptions of myopic behavior and lack of coordination
among Internet transit providers are over-simplistic. It may be true that in a “tiny” Internet
with just a handful of providers some form of coordination, or anticipation of the actions
of other players, is feasible. Considering however that the Internet consists of thousands of
providers, and that each of them only has limited information about the traffic, customers,
peers, or even the strategic objectives of other providers, we believe that the previous two
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assumptions are not unrealistic in practice. In section 6.2, we show with large-scale sim-
ulations and under more realistic conditions that the observed gravitation towards Open
peering is also evident there.
6.2 Computational Study
The analytical model of the previous section only considers two transit providers and it does
not incorporate several factors that are important in practice such as dynamic, location-
dependent competitive pricing, economies-of-scale, public vs. private peering, heavily
skewed traffic matrix, etc. In this section, we employ computational agent-based modeling
involving a large number of agents in a realistic setting to validate and further investigate
the analytical results of the previous section. The main objective is to examine whether a
move of transit providers towards Open peering can be observed under more realistic con-
ditions. Further, we want to explore which classes of providers are more affected by this
move, and to determine the economic impact of Open peering on the AS population in a
macro scale.
6.2.1 Computational Model Description
We introduce here two modifications to GENESIS for the purposes of this study:
1. In the original GENESIS model, transit providers are assigned a peering strategy
based on their hierarchical status in the network (Tier-1 transit providers use Restric-
tive, non-Tier1 transit providers use Selective and stubs use Open). In order to reflect
the peering strategy decision process described in section 6.1.1, we modify GENE-
SIS so that transit providers evaluate each of the three peering strategies and choose
the one that maximizes their utility.
2. In the original GENESIS model, transit prices are randomly assigned to ASes. Fur-
ther, these randomly assigned prices do not change over the course of the simu-
lation. Here, we introduce competitive, location-dependent dynamic pricing. All
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transit providers at a given location have the same price. Thus, a transit provider
which has presence in more than one locations may have a different price at differ-
ent locations. The greater the number of transit providers at a location, the lower
the transit price. The parameterization of this pricing model is based on data from
TeleGeography [102].
6.2.2 Simulation Results
We begin by comparing the following two scenarios: Selective-Restrictive (SR) and Selective-
Restrictive-Open (SRO). Under the SR scenario, transit providers choose only between the
Selective and Restrictive strategies. In the SRO scenario, transit providers choose between
Selective, Restrictive and Open. Stubs always use Open peering in both scenarios. In each
scenario, we run multiple simulations, each with a distinct population of agents, to generate
100 network equilibria. A comparison of the previous two scenarios allows us to investi-
gate the effect of Open peering on both the providers that adopt it and on the Internet as a
whole.
6.2.2.1 Gravitation towards Open peering
In this section, we compare the SR and SRO scenarios in terms of the peering strategies
adopted by the population of transit providers.
The distribution of peering strategies in the SR scenario shows that 90% of providers
use Selective peering, while the remaining 10% use Restrictive. In SR, most providers peer
with agents that have similar hierarchical status. The peers of transit providers include large
content providers and consumer stubs that are able to satisfy the Selective peering criteria
by virtue of their large traffic volume. On the other hand, the SRO scenario results in a
radical change in the peering strategy distribution – 79% of transit providers adopt Open
peering, 20% adopt Selective peering, while only 1% adopt Restrictive.
We find that the attraction towards Open peering is not uniform across all transit providers.





































































































































Figure 20: Peering strategy distribution – classification by traffic volume.
their geographical expanse4 increases. Similarly, Figure 20 shows that the fraction of agents
adopting Open peering decreases as their traffic volume increases. When classified based
on network hierarchy we find that 6.5% of Tier-1 (agents without transit providers), 58%
of Tier-2 (agents which are transit customers of Tier-1 providers ) and 87% of Tier-3 (all
non-Tier1 and non-Tier2 agents) transit providers adopt Open peering.
What causes these differences in the adoption of Open peering? The geographical
4The geographical expanse of a provider is the number of locations in which it is present. Recall that two
agents can interconnect only if they are co-located.
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expanse and peering strategy of a provider are correlated for two reasons. First, the local
traffic of an agent is a function of its geographical expanse; as expanse increases, so does its
local traffic volume [74]. Second, an agent with large expanse can attract more customers,
which increases its transit volume. A transit provider with large expanse (and hence large
traffic volume) is able to peer with other large transit providers using the Selective or Re-
strictive policies, avoiding peering with smaller agents.
6.2.2.2 Impact on economic utility
The conventional wisdom is that Open peering is generally associated with a reduction of
upstream transit costs and thus, increased utility. However, the complex interdependencies
between providers that were discussed in Section-III often cause the opposite effect, i.e.,
Open peering results in utility loss. In each of the 100 equilibria that we generated using
GENESIS, the cumulative utility of all transit providers under the SRO scenario is lower
than that of the SR scenario. As a whole, the population of transit providers does better
without Open peering.
A decrease in the cumulative utility of the provider population under SRO does not im-
ply, however, that all providers see lower utility. We find that 30% of the transit providers
have higher utility in the SRO scenario. To understand this effect, recall that a provider’s
utility is a function of its transit costs, peering costs, and transit revenues. We classify tran-
sit providers into two classes based on whether their utility increases or decreases by more
than 10% between the SR and SRO scenarios. Providers of both classes see an increase
in peering costs and a decrease in transit costs under SRO. The difference between the two
classes is due to changes in transit revenues. Practically all transit providers that have lower
utility under SRO, see their transit revenues decrease by more than 20% in that scenario.
Among the transit providers that experience a utility increase on the other hand, 70% do
not see a significant variation (meaning, it stays within 20% of their utility under SR), and













































Figure 21: Peering strategy adoption by 4 classes of transit providers.
scenario are typically those that a) have customers who cannot peer with other providers
(as a result of co-location constraints) and b) they can peer with many other agents.
6.2.2.3 Who gains and who loses from Open peering?
We examine here in more detail the characteristics of providers that either gain or lose
utility as a result of the gravitation towards Open peering. To better understand which
providers gain or lose from Open peering, we classify them into 4 classes, based on their
traffic volume and number of customers.
Class-1: Small traffic volume, few customers.
Class-2: Small traffic volume, many customers.
Class-3: Large traffic volume, few customers.
Class-4: Large traffic volume, many customers.
Class-1 includes players in the bottom 30% of providers by traffic volume and the
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Utility under Selective strategy
(b) Large Traffic Volume and Many Customers
Fitness increase
Fitness reduction
Figure 22: Utility variations in two classes of transit providers.
classes similarly. Based on this classification, 16% of providers are in Class-1, 9% in Class-
2, 9% in Class-3 and 37% in Class-4. Figure 21 shows the peering strategy distribution
in each class. We find that the affinity for Open peering decreases as the traffic volume
and number of customers increase. In each class, we identify providers that use Selective
peering under SR and Open peering under SRO. Figures 22(a) and 22(b) show, respectively,
the utility of nodes in Class-1 and Class-4 when they switch from Selective under SR to
Open under SRO.
Class-1: 90% of Class-1 players undergo an increase in utility. They reduce their upstream
transit costs through Open peering as they are denied peering by larger providers due to
their small size. Their customers do not have many peers since they are even more limited
in geographic expanse. This makes Class-1 player less vulnerable to their transit traffic
being diverted away from them.
Class-4: Providers in Class-4 mostly lose by adopting Open peering; 84% of them show
utility loss. Their large number of customers makes such providers more vulnerable to
having their transit traffic being diverted away from them as their customers peer with
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other providers. Providers in Classes 2 and 3 have less predictable behavior due to their
conflicting characteristics. 55% of providers in Class-2 and 25% in Class-3 increase their
utility with Open peering.
CHAPTER VII
PROPOSED PEERING STRATEGIES
7.1 A variation of Open peering strategy
The combination of myopic peering strategy selection and lack of coordination between
transit providers results in utility loss for many transit providers. The main underlying
issue is that, under the Open strategy, providers peer with customers of their peers. Here,
we consider a simple coordination scheme in which transit providers agree not to do that.
The proposed scheme is referred to as Direct Customer Forbiddance (DCF). With DCF,
a provider p can still peer openly but it should not peer with anyone that is a customer of
p’s peers.
To illustrate this rule, we refer to the network of Figure 17. If i and j adopt the DCF
policy, they cannot peer with y and x respectively. In practice, it is feasible for a transit
provider i to infer the customers of an existing peer j by examining the BGP routes that j
sends to i over the peering session.
7.1.1 Utility under DCF
Consider, for instance, the network of Section 6.1.3.2. If the DCF constraint is adopted, i
will switch to Open peering so that it can directly peer with w but i will not peer with y.
This allows i to divert all its transit traffic to peering links Lij and Liw. Since, no customer
traffic is diverted away from j, the latter does not have any benefit to switch to Open peering
and it stays with the Selective strategy. The equilibrium (O, S) in this case is optimal for
both players:
ui(O, S)− ui(O,O) = (Pi − α)× (Vjx + Txy) ≥ 0 (33)


































Figure 23: Cumulative utility distribution of transit providers under 3 scenarios
Recall that the network in Section 6.1.3.2 reached equilibrium (O,O) where i not only
reduced its upstream transit costs but also suffered a loss in transit revenue. After the
introduction of DCF, i only reduces its upstream transit costs. Hence, the DCF variant
improves i’s utility.
We have also investigated the impact of the DCF Open peering variant on different
types of providers using GENESIS. We find that under SRD, the cumulative utility of transit
providers is greater than under SRO and it approaches that with the SR scenario. Figure 23
shows the CDF of the cumulative utility of transit providers that use Selective peering under
the SR scenario, but switch to Open under SRO and DCF under SRD. The CDF is computed
across 100 equilibria.
The cumulative utility of the transit provider population improves with DCF. This is
because (a) transit providers no longer “steal” revenue-generating traffic from their peers
and (b) transit providers can aggregate peering traffic over few links, reducing peering
costs due to the related economies-of-scale. Note, however, that DCF will not have a
positive effect on all transit providers. Transit providers higher in the network hierarchy






























Figure 24: Strategy distribution of providers in five distinct scenarios
providers lower in the hierarchy may have a negative impact on their utility under DCF.
In Section 6.2.2.3, we showed that, without DCF, 80% of Class-1 providers gain and 84%
of Class-4 providers lose by the introduction of the Open peering strategy. When DCF is
adopted, however, 53% of Class-1 providers gain and 68% of Class-4 providers lose utility.
In other words, DCF tends to reduce the positive or negative economic impact of Open
peering, even though there is still significant variability across different provider classes.
Furthermore, if a few providers disregard DCF then their peers conforming to DCF will
end up with worse economic utilities.
7.1.2 DCF adoption dynamics
We now explore the behavior of providers if DCF and Open peering are both available as
two distinct strategy choices. The key question is whether providers find DCF sufficiently
attractive to adopt it without explicit coordination.
We consider the following scenarios:
SRO: Providers choose among: 1) Selective, 2) Restrictive, 3) Open.
SRD: Providers choose among: 1) Selective, 2) Restrictive, 3) DCF.
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SRDO: DCF and Open are both available from the beginning. Providers choose among:
1) Selective, 2) Restrictive, 3) Open, 4) DCF.
Perturb SRO equilibrium with SRO+D: When the network reaches equilibrium in the
SRO scenario, we perturb it by adding the DCF strategy in the set of available policies, and
force providers to re-evaluate their peering strategy.
Perturb SRD equilibrium with SRD+O: When the network reaches equilibrium in the
SRD scenario, we perturb it by adding Open peering to the available strategies, and force
all providers to re-evaluate their peering policy.
Figure 24 shows the strategy distribution for each of the previous five scenarios. We
find that the providers are more attracted to DCF than to Open. Further, while DCF is
able to significantly perturb the SRO equilibrium, attracting 68% of the transit providers,
the Open policy is not able to significantly perturb the SRD equilibrium. These simulation
results imply that the adoption of the DCF peering variant may be possible, at least between
a large subset of transit providers, even if there is no explicit coordination between them.
7.2 Cost-Benefit-Analysis based Peering Strategy
Cost Benefit Analysis: When using Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) peering strategy, an
agent x separately evaluates the impact of each peering link (existing or potential) on its
fitness, as opposed to broad rule-based peering strategies, e.g., Selective, Open, etc. For
example, under Open strategy, xwould peer with all potential peers regardless of the impact
of each peering relationship on its fitness. Under CBA, x agrees to establish (or retain) only
those peering links that can have a positive impact on its fitness. In GENESIS, only transit
providers employ the CBA strategy.
In order to establish a new peering link using CBA, x evaluates each potential peer y
by hypothetically establishing a peering link with it. Each new link in the network causes
some traffic to be re-routed along different paths based on the interdomain routing policy.
x computes the impact of the hypothetical peering link by updating its traffic flow, costs
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and revenue. x agrees to peer with y if and only if its fitness increases as a result of the
hypothetical link. In the real world, such link evaluations are carried out through peering
trials. Under a peering trial, two ASes establish a peering relationship for a short time
period and evaluate the impact of the temporary link on their economic fitness. The link
is retained if both peers find the relationship beneficial for their fitness, otherwise it is
terminated. Similar evaluations are carried out for existing peers when using CBA. Each
existing peer is hypothetically depeered and the impact of depeering on fitness is computed.
The link is terminated if depeering improves fitness, otherwise it is retained.
Scalability of CBA: We assume that an agent x can choose any number of peers from
PP (x) (from 0 to n− 1). Traffic in the interdomain network is routed based on the short-
est path prefer customer over peer over provider links routing policy. The addition (or
removal) of a peering link may affect the flow of traffic on other peering links. Thus, for
x, peering with agent yi may impact the evaluation of agent yj . We explain this by means
of the following example. Let yj be a customer of yi. Let Vxyi and Vxyj denote the traffic
exchanged between x and yi and yj respectively. If x peers with yi, then traffic from both
yi and yj flows over the x—yi peering link as shown in figure 25. The peering cost for x
with the single peering link is given by equation 35. If x peers with both yi and yj then
traffic from both ASes traverses separate peering links as shown in figure 26. The peering
cost for x with both peering links is given by equation 36 while equation 37 shows that the
cost under the two scenarios is different.
PC(x) = α× (Vxyi + Vxyj)β (35)
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Hence the question is: how should x go about finding its peers from among potential
peers? In order to find the optimal set of peers, x would have to evaluate each combination








Note that each combination would involve evaluation of k peering links by both agents
involved. Given the large co-location density in many regions of the interdomain network,
the number of evaluations required to determine the optimal set of peers may be infeasible.
Figure 25: Peering between x and yi only
CBA heuristic: CBA involves computation of all traffic flows, costs and revenue by x.
Hence, employing this strategy to evaluate all potential and existing peers is not scalable.
We propose a simple heuristic to alleviate scalability issues with CBA. Although our pro-
posed heuristic does not compute the optimal set of peers, yet it allows agents to prioritize
peers based on peering traffic aggregation and avoid redundant evaluations.
Our heuristic exploits a key feature of the valley-free routing policy employed in the
Internet. It is based on the notion that if an AS x can reach AS y through an existing
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Figure 26: Peering between x and yi, and x and yj
peering link Lxz with another AS z, then the peering link Lxy would be redundant. Such a
link would not save x any transit costs and would only add to its peering costs. Thus, if x
finds that it has a peering path to y, it can refuse to peer with y without actually evaluating
it. Note that if x is able to reach y through an existing peering link, then it implies that y is
in the customer tree of an existing peer of x.
This heuristic is explained in Figure 27. The figure shows x and z as peers while y is
in the customer tree of z. In Figure 27a, x is not a peer of y. In this network, traffic from
x to y flows over the peering link Lxz. Thus, x is able to reach y over an existing peering
link. If Vxz and Vxy is the total traffic volume exchanged between x and z, and x and y
respectively, then the peering cost of x is given by:
PC(x) = α× (Vxz + Vxy)β (39)
In Figure 27b, x peers with z. Thus, traffic between x and z flows over the direct
peering link and now the peering cost of x is given by:
PC ′(x) = α× (Vxz)β + α× (Vxy)β (40)
Note that the peering cost of x is increased because of the additional peering link.
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Thus, if an agent x can reach another agent y through an existing peer higher up in
the network hierarchy, it does not need to establish a redundant peering link with y. The
redundant peering link does not reduce upstream transit costs; on the other hand it adds
to the cost of peering by reducing the advantage of economies-of-scale. Therefore, x can
decide not to peer with y without actually doing cost-benefit-analysis. Algorithms 1 and 2
give the procedures for depeering and peering respectively using CBA.
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(a) y in customer tree of x
(b) x peering with y
Figure 27: CBA heuristic example
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Input PP (i) = {x1, x2, ....., xn}
Sort PP (i) hierarchically PP (i) = {x1, x2, ....xt, xt+1, ...xz} : xt /∈ C(xt+1)
Do PP (i)← PP (i)− xk : xk ∈ C(xj), j < k {Remove from PP (i) all peers which
are in customer trees of other existing peers}
Do CBA for ∀xj ∈ PP (i)
Do Foriginal ← F (i)
Do Remove peering link between i and xj
Do Route traffic
Do Compute F (i)
Fupdate ← F (i)
If Fupdate > Foriginal
Do PP (i)← PP (i)− xj
Algorithm 1: Depeering by agent i using CBA
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Do PP ′(i)← j ∀j /∈ C(k) ∀k ∈ PP (i)
Do PP ′(i) = PP ′P (i)
⋃
PP ′S(i) : C(j) = ∅ ∀j ∈ PP ′P (i), C(j) 6= ∅ ∀j ∈
PP ′P (i), PPP (i)
⋂
PP ′S(i) = ∅
Sort PP ′P (i) hierarchically PP ′P (i) = {x1, x2, ....xt, xt+1, ...xz} : xt /∈ C(xt+1)
Do CBA ∀xj ∈ PP ′P (i)
Do Foriginal ← F (i)
Do Establish peering link between i and xj
Do Route traffic
Do Compute F (i)
Fupdate ← F (i)
If Fupdate > Foriginal
Do PP (i)← PP (i) + xj
Do PPS(i)← PPS(i)− xk ∀xk ∈ C(xj), xk ∈ PPP (i)
Do CBA ∀xj ∈ PP ′S(i)
Do Foriginal ← F (i)
Do Establish peering link between i and xj
Do Route traffic
Do Compute F (i)
Fupdate ← F (i)
If Fupdate > Foriginal
Do PP (i)← PP (i) + xj
Algorithm 2: Peering by agent i using CBA
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
The Internet consists of thousands of heterogeneous Autonomous Systems (ASes) that vol-
untarily form bilateral (sometimes conditional) interconnection agreements to provide end-
to-end reachability. This thesis on a specific class of links - peering, from an economic per-
spective. Peering interactions between ASes in the Internet are local, without centralized
control or regulation, but they often have global impact on the performance and profitabil-
ity of networks and sometimes the global economy. Additionally, the Internet behaves as a
co-evolutionary network in which the state of the nodes and the network topology change
at the same time, through coupled interactions.
The main contributions of this thesis include:
1. Identification of fundamental complexities underlying the evaluation of peers and
formation of stable peering links in the interdomain network. We identify the topo-
logical structure and routing policies in the Internet as key limiting factors in the
formation of optimal peering relationships.
2. An empirical study of the state of the peering ecosystem from August 2010 to Au-
gust 2013. We find strong correlations among different measures of AS size, e.g.,
advertised address space (from BGP), traffic volume, geographic expanse, etc., and
between these size measures and the peering strategies that those ASes use.
3. Development of a large-scale agent-based computational model to study the forma-
tion and evolution of the Internet interdomain network.
4. Proposition of a plausible explanation for the gravitation of Internet transit providers
towards Open peering and a prediction of its future consequences. Our studies show
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that large-scale adoption of Open peering by transit providers can be attributed to
their myopic and selfish peering actions and these practices are detrimental to their
long-term economic fitness as well.
5. Proposition of two new practical peering strategies. We propose a variant of the
contemporary Open peering policy and a new policy based on cost-benefit analysis
to replace the contemporary simplistic policies.
Future Work
We identify three main threads for future research in the context of this thesis: (a)
optimal connectivity decisions in the Internet interdomain network (b) analysis of the in-
terdomain network topology to ensure traffic routing over trusted ASes and (c) resolution
of peering disputes between ASes before they escalate to disconnectivity.
Optimal connectivity decisions in the Internet interdomain network: In this research
we will focus on developing algorithms which exploit real-world topology and traffic data
to determine an AS’ connectivity to optimize its financial utility subject to performance and
resource constraints. Current operational practices for connectivity decisions adopt very
simplistic and myopic approaches because of the intractability of the problem. However,
knowledge of real-world topology, routing policies and some knowledge of traffic matrix
can be exploited to significantly reduce the complexity and improve an AS’ financial utility.
Peering to ensure traffic routing over trusted ASes: Security and privacy have been the
focus of recent debates on the future of the Internet. An AS typically has multiple op-
tions (including multiple transit providers and peers) to send traffic to other destinations.
Since next-hop neighbors of an AS (both peers and transit providers) also have similar
configurations, it results in a wide array of choices for end-to-end paths. So far, topol-
ogy decisions such as the choice of upstream transit providers and settlement-free peers
has been driven by financial and performance considerations only. However, many large
ASes are increasingly concerned about the complete path, beyond the next-hop, because of
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threats to security and privacy of their traffic. For example, an intermediate AS in the path
can measure the traffic volume being sent from the source to the destination and can use
this information to develop competitive peering strategies. In this research, we intend to
propose practical mechanisms whereby an AS can exploit publicly available topology and
NetFlow data, utilize simple network tools and a few peering trials to determine its peers
so as to ensure that its traffic flows over trusted ASes as much as possible.
Resolution of peering disputes: The third research question in the context of computer
networks focuses on Internet peering disputes, which often cause performance and un-
reachability problems for millions of Internet users. The importance of this question can
be judged from the fact that such disputes have increasingly hit the headlines recently, e.g.,
the Comcast vs. Level-3 peering dispute [94]. Such disputes have led to litigation, calls
for intervention by regulators [69] and legislation at the highest levels of government [89].
Moreover, such disputes have sometimes resulted in the partitioning of the Internet render-
ing significant organizations with critical communication needs, e.g., NASA and Federal
Aviation Administration (USA), disconnected from the Internet [103]. Furthermore, the
frequency of such disputes is likely to increase in future [96]. In this research we will
explore the following question: what is the fundamental reason behind these disputes and
how can they be avoided? We will analyze such conflicts and propose new paid-peering
and pricing schemes to avoid such disputes.
Refined Peering Decisions:
The current economic framework for peering requires that peers negotiate their links
based on the aggregate traffic, in both directions, that they exchange between each other.
Large ASes often use the ratio of inbound to outbound traffic on a peering link as part of
their selective criteria to choose peers. The peering ratios model assumes that all traffic is
equal in terms of costs and value and therefore traffic volume can be used as a proxy to
measure the relative benefit. We believe that traffic ratios are not the most appropriate fac-
tor to make peering decisions because the previously mentioned assumptions do not hold
true in all cases. The cost of carrying traffic and the value derived from it may be very
different across ASes. Hence, peering ratios based decision making should be replaced by
more refined cost-benefit-analysis models. We propose that future economic frameworks
should enable any two ASes in the Internet to negotiate a price for any traffic flow between
a unique source and destination pair. For example AS x should be able to figure out what
price it should offer to AS y to reach AS z for a traffic flow associated with service f .
Thus, future economic frameworks should enable the peers to put a price/cost tag on each
(source, destination, flow) triple. For such a framework, x would need to know (or esti-
mate) the traffic volume to be sent from y to z, the fraction of y’s traffic going to z, other
options available to y, its own capacity, constraints for the flow f , etc.
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